Rethinking Computer Network  Attack : Implications for Law and U.S. Doctrine by Walker, Paul A.
33NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEFVol. 1, No. 1
RETHINKING COMPUTER NETWORK “ATTACK”:
IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW AND U.S. DOCTRINE
PAUL A. WALKER
I.  Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................33
II. The Defi nition of  “Attack” in International Humanitarian Law...................................................38
 A. “Acts of  Violence”..........................................................................................................................39
 B. Determining whether an “Act of  Violence” exists....................................................................42
  1. Actor-based Methodology................................................................................................42
  2. Results-based Methodology..............................................................................................43 
 3. Consequences-based Methodology...............................................................................................45
III. Capabilities Used in Information-Based Actions............................................................................48
 A. Distributed Denial of  Service Actions........................................................................................48
 B. Chip-level Actions............................................................................................................................53
IV. Implications for Law and U.S. Doctrine...........................................................................................60
 A. Implications for Law......................................................................................................................60
 B. Implications for U.S. Doctrine......................................................................................................61
 C.Critique of  the Air and Missile Warfare Manual.........................................................................63
      V.  Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................66
I.  INTRODUCTION
The law is built on words.  The meaning of  words is often an integral part of  legal analysis.  
Indeed, in our adversarial system, the parties to a lawsuit spend a great deal of  time arguing for 
contrasting defi nition of  key words.  Even relatively mundane words get high-level treatment.  The 
United States Supreme Court has recently reached for its dictionary to defi ne such ordinary words 
as “arrange,”1 “elect,”2  and “deliver.”3  In international law cases, the Court has found itself  looking 
1  Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1879 (2009).
2  Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561, 2570 (2009).
3  Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 152 (2007).
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for the “ordinary meaning”4 of  such commonplace words as “accident”5 and “event.”6  It is surpris-
ing, then, that so much current legal scholarship dealing with information-age warfare uses “attack” 
without defi ning it or examining the meaning given to “attack” under international humanitarian law 
(IHL).
Article 49 of  Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions defi nes “attack” in the fol-
lowing way:  “acts of  violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.”7  That defi ni-
tion applies not only to the 169 State parties that have ratifi ed Additional Protocol I, but should also 
be considered part of  customary international law applying to all states involved in international 
armed confl ict.  The drafters of  the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Confl icts 
at Sea took this position,8 incorporating substantially the same defi nition in Article 13(b) of  the Man-
ual.9  Likewise, the recently published Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, 
an effort to compile the existing rules of  IHL for air and missile warfare, uses the same defi nition of  
“attack” as contained in the San Remo Manual.10  In its 2005 study of  customary international law ap-
plicable to armed confl icts, the International Committee of  the Red Cross (ICRC) does not provide 
a defi nition of  “attack,” but the ICRC study repeatedly uses the term in rules dealing with protection 
of  the civilian population.11  Most of  those rules are drawn either directly from Additional Protocol 
4  Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.  
5  Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 651 n.6 (2004).
6  Id. at 655.
7  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of  12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of  Victims of  
International Armed Confl icts (Protocol I) art. 49, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
8  SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA 5 (Louise Doswald-Beck, ed., 
1995) (“most of  its provisions are considered to state the law which is currently applicable”) [hereinafter SAN REMO 
MANUAL]; see also Louise Doswald-Beck, The San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Confl icts At Sea, 89 
AM. J. INT’L L. 192, 192 (1995) (stating that the Manual contains “international law currently applicable to armed confl icts 
at sea”). The Explanation to the Manual states that Manual’s defi nition of  “attack” was “inspired by” the defi nition 
contained in Additional Protocol I.  SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 8, at 86.  
9   SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 8, at 9 (“‘attack’ means an act of  violence, whether in offence or defence”).  The 
primary difference is the San Remo Manual’s omission of  the term “against the adversary,” from its defi nition of  attack.  
The Manual’s Explanation attributes this omission to the fact that, unlike in land warfare, “it is lawful to carry out acts 
of  violence against neutral shipping or neutral aircraft in certain limited situations.”  Id. at 87.  For present purposes, this 
difference is not signifi cant.  The key term examined in this paper, “act of  violence,” is retained in the San Remo Manual 
formulation. 
10   HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE, PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN 
POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH 1 (2009) [hereinafter AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE MANUAL] (stating that attack “means an 
act of  violence, whether in offence or in defence.”).
11  For instance, the very fi rst rule in the Study states:  “Attacks may only be directed against combatants.  Attacks 
must not be directed against civilians.” Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A 
Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of  Law in Armed Confl ict, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 175, 198 (2005).  
The Annex to Henckaerts’s article lists all 161 rules the ICRC study found to be “Customary Rules of  International 
Humanitarian Law.”  Id. at 198–212.  “Attack” is prominently featured in many of  the fi rst 24 rules listed in the ICRC 
study, dealing with the areas of  distinction between civilians and combatants, distinction between civilian objects and 
military objectives, indiscriminate attacks, proportionality and precautions in attack, and precautions against the effects 
of  attacks.  Id at 198–200.   
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I, or echo its terms quite closely.
Although the United States has not ratifi ed Additional Protocol I, it is a signatory to the Proto-
col and has long taken the position that many portions of  the protocol are customary international 
law.12  Viewing Article 49 as customary law is consistent with this approach, in particular because a 
number of  subsequent articles that use “attack” are, according to the United States, refl ective of  cus-
tomary international law.13  
Specifi cally, the key principle that belligerents must distinguish between combatants and civilians 
and military and civilian objectives is embodied in Articles 51 and 52.14  The key to understanding 
both articles, though, is their repeated use of  the word “attack.”  It is “attack[s]” that cannot be di-
rected against the civilian population or individual civilians.15  Likewise, it is an “attack” that shall not 
be directed at civilian objects.16  Article 51 also prohibits “indiscriminate attacks” against civilians,17 
while Article 52 requires “attacks” to be “limited strictly to military objectives.”18  But not every mili-
tary operation or action is an “attack,” as defi ned in Article 49 and used in these key provisions.19  It 
is often the case that military operations have negative effects on a civilian population.  For instance, 
the movement of  armies prior to, or during an attack, often leads to large displacements of  the 
population.  For those that remain in place during such movements, daily life faces severe disrup-
tions, including slowed or non-existent mail service and other forms of  communication.  IHL is 
not designed to eliminate all impacts on civilians and civilian objects, but to guard against the worst 
impacts resulting from the destructive force of  military attacks.20 
This article takes a very narrow approach to this area of  IHL.  It ignores the jus ad bellum con-
cepts of  “use of  force” and self-defense in response to an “armed attack.”21  Instead, it assumes that 
a state of  “armed confl ict” under Common Article 2 of  the Geneva Conventions exists in order to 
focus on the defi nition of  an “attack.”  Rather than examining hypothetical scenarios, the methodol-
12  See Michael J. Matheson, Session One:  The United States Position on the Relation of  Customary International Law to the 1977 
Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 Am. U.J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 419, 426 (1987).
13  Id. (pointing to portions of  Articles 51 and 52 as containing such principles). 
14  Additional Protocol I, supra note 7, arts. 51, 52.
15  Id. art. 51(2).
16  Id. art. 52(1).
17  Id. art. 51(4).
18  Id. art. 52(2).
19  Of  course, “attack” is used in other parts of  Additional Protocol I as well.  See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra 
note 7, art. 12 (“Protection of  medical units”), art. 42 (“Occupants of  aircraft”), art. 44 (“Combatants and prisoners of  
war”), art. 54 (“Protection of  objects indispensable to the survival of  the civilian population”), art. 56 (“Protection of  
works and installations containing dangerous forces”), art. 57 (“Precautions in attack”).  
20  See Michael N. Schmitt, Wired Warfare:  Computer Network Attack and Jus in Bello, INT’L REV. RED CROSS 365, 373, 378 
(2002).
21  As the San Remo Manual points out, “attack” is separately defi ned “to make it quite clear that references to 
‘attack’ in humanitarian law are not to be confused with the concept of  an armed attack as referred to in Article 2(4) 
of  the United Nations Charter.” SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 8, at 86.  For analysis of  the jus ad bellum aspects of  
information-based actions, see generally Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE (1999) and Michael N. 
Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of  Force in International Law:  Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 885 (1999).
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ogy used to defi ne an “attack” is then applied to known capabilities that may be (or, in some cases, 
have been)22 used in information-based operations or actions by a State.23  Such an examination is 
necessary not only because it is not well addressed by the legal literature,24 but also because “attack” 
is so comprehensively overused throughout our internet society.25  This is perhaps understandable 
in the media and the technical literature, which describes any adverse action against a computer 
or a computer network as an “attack.”  Unfortunately, this common use of  “attack” has bled over 
into legal analysis and military doctrine, specifi cally into the Air and Missile Warfare Manual and the 
United States doctrine of  “computer network attack.”26  When the meaning of  “attack” is rigorously 
22  Although the examples used to demonstrate these potential capabilities did not occur during periods of  armed 
confl ict (i.e., jus ad bellum, or use of  force, principles would have applied to them at the time they occurred, with the 
possible exception of  the information-based actions against Georgia discussed infra section III.A.), the analysis applied 
to  these capabilities in this article assumes their use during an established international armed confl ict (between two 
state actors) and assesses whether or not the use of  such a capability during a period of  armed confl ict would amount to 
an “attack” under IHL (jus in bello).  
23  One European commentator has reviewed distributed denial of  service actions under “public international law,” 
but assumed that such actions are a “major weapon of  cyberwarfare” and did not examine such actions under Article 
49 of  Additional Protocol I.  Stefan Kirchner, Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS)-Attacks Under Public International Law:  
State-Responsibility in Cyberwar, 8 ICFAI UNIV. J. CYBER L. 10 (quoting from the abstract).  Unfortunately, Kirchner 
incorrectly holds out the least destructive of  information-based actions, denials-of-service, as the poster-child for all 
“cyberweapons,” making unsupported assertions about possible consequences that could result from such actions, such 
as death, id. at 18 (“There is no information if  ever anybody has been killed by a DDoS attack, but it cannot be excluded 
completely that this is a possibility”) (emphasis added), and disruption of  a nation’s electric grid, id. at 15.  Kirchner 
makes these claims despite accurately describing distributed denial-of-service actions and the fact that there are an 
estimated 10,000 such actions every day.  Id. at 12.  In fact, DDoS actions essentially effect affect traffi c on the internet 
and at websites connected to the internet and affect computers connected to the internet only in their actions on the 
network and not their ability to be used for other functions, see infra notes 72–79, and accompanying text, especially 
if  disconnected from the internet at the onset of  a denial of  service action.  Although an electric company’s website 
could be affected by a denial of  service action, electrical company control systems generally operate separately from the 
internet, such that they cannot be affectedby denial of  service actions, though they can defi nitely be impacted by viruses 
and other types of  malicious software.  See generally Eric J. Byres, Cyber Security and the Pipeline Control System, PIPELINE & 
GAS J. 58–59 (Feb. 2009), available at http://www.oildompublishing.com/PGJ/pgjarchive/Feb09/cyber.pdff   (describing 
the effects of  malicious software, the Slammer worm, on control systems and highlighting the fact that the worm used at 
least fi ve different pathways to get into the victimized control systems).                                       
24  Only Professor Schmitt has examined Article 49’s defi nition of  “attack” in any signifi cant detail, see Schmitt, supra 
note 20, at 376–77, and no one has applied the defi nition to the types of  information-based capabilities that may be 
used in attacks during an armed confl ict.
25  See, e.g., Joshua Davis, Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe, WIRED, Aug. 21, 2007, available at http://
www.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/15-09/ff_estonia; Kevin J. Houle & George M. Weaver, Trends in Denial of  
Service Attack Technology, CERT Coordination Center, 1 (Oct. 2001), available at http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/DoS_
trends.pdf.  These are just two examples of  sources used in this article, but every technical and media source cited refers 
to these actions as “attacks.”
26  See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13: INFORMATION OPERATIONS, at II-5 (2006), available at http://
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf  (last accessed August 25, 2010) [hereinafter JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13] 
defi nes computer network attack as “actions taken through the use of  computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or 
destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves.”  
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examined and applied to known action capabilities,27 there are three clear implications.  First, aca-
demic concerns about a distinction problem arising from the use of  information-based capabilities 
are overblown.  Second, and stemming from the fi rst implication, is the conclusion that recent calls 
for new treaties or new “international law for information operations” are premature.  Finally, the 
various permutations of  “computer network attack” based on the United States’ information opera-
tions doctrine28 are legally unsound and should be revised.  From a legal perspective the new Air and 
Missile Warfare Manual egregiously expands that defi nition29 and unwisely portrays the problematic 
defi nition30 that results as existing law.31  These implications are particularly relevant at a time when 
the United States and Russia appear to be moving towards discussion of  these issues.32  In light of  
the differing Russian approach to “computer network attack,”33 it is important that the terms and 
defi nitions used are grounded in the law and not derived from the popular mythology that surrounds 
notions of  “cyberwar.”  The intent of  this article is to begin that reappraisal by examining what con-
stitutes an “attack” when the internet or computers and computer networks are involved.
Part II of  this article examines the defi nition of  “attack” under international humanitarian law 
and derives a methodology for applying that defi nition to the use of  information-based capabilities.  
Part III then examines two specifi c capabilities: distributed denial of  service (DDoS) actions and 
27  “Capability” and “action” are used throughout this article in an effort to be terminologically precise.  Such terms 
are also used to avoid referring to something as a “weapon” or an “attack” until it demonstrably is, or can be used as, a 
weapon or an attack.  “Capability” is also appropriate because many of  them are capable of  being used as weapons, but 
also may be used in other ways.  In this analysis, the use to which the capability is applied is key.
28  See Joint Publication 3-13, supra note 26 and accompanying text.
29  The AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE MANUAL incorporated essentially all of  the U.S. doctrinal defi nition into its own 
defi nition of  “computer network attack,” as well as two additional, even more problematic concepts:  manipulation 
and gaining control over the computer or computer network.  AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE MANUAL, supra note 10, at 6 
(defi ning “computer network attack” to mean “operations to manipulate, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information 
resident in computers and computer networks, or the computer network itself, or to gain control over the computer or 
computer network”) (emphasis added).  It appears that the drafters of  the AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE MANUAL have fully 
bought into the popular conception of  what constitutes an “attack” on computers.  
30  The AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE MANUAL defi nition is problematic because the additions it makes to the U.S. 
doctrinal defi nition, Joint Publication 3-13, supra note 26 and accompanying text, will encompass espionage activities 
that could legally occur in peacetime, outside the jus in bello setting of  “armed confl ict.”  In addition, the defi nition is 
problematic because its use of  “attack” in the term “computer network attack” is completely and illogically disconnected 
from the Manual’s own defi nition of  “attack.”  The Commentary makes this clear:  “The term ‘attack’ in ‘computer 
network attack’ is not meant to necessarily imply that all such operations constitute an attack as that term is used 
elsewhere in this Manual (see defi nition of  ‘attack’ as set forth in Rule 1 (e)).  Some CNA operations may rise to the level 
of  an attack as defi ned in Rule 1 (e), whereas others will not.”  COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL 
LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE, PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH 34 (2010) 
[hereinafter AMW COMMENTARY].  For further discussion of  these points, see infra Part IV.C.  
31  AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 30, at 2 (describing the goal of  the AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE MANUAL as “to 
present a methodical restatement of  existing international law on air and missile warfare . . . to systematically capture in 
the text the lex lata as it is.”).
32  See John Markoff  and Andrew E. Kramer, In Shift, U.S. Talks to Russia on Internet Security, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2009, 
at A1.
33  See infra note 182.
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chip-level actions.34  Though much about this area remains classifi ed, there is a substantial body of  
technical literature available, especially with respect to DDoS, to understand the possible uses and 
potential effects of  these capabilities.  For each capability, this section of  the article will also review 
known or suspected examples of  state practice in employing such capabilities.  Following the expli-
cation of  each of  these capabilities, the methodology developed in Part II will be applied to deter-
mine whether the use of  each capability, or some uses, should be considered attacks under IHL.  
Because this analysis concludes that DDoS actions, and some uses of  chip-level actions (and by 
implication, malicious software actions), are not attacks under IHL, the implications of  these conclu-
sions are addressed in Part IV.  Finally, Part V concludes.           
II.  THE DEFINITION OF “ATTACK” IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
The four Geneva Conventions concluded in 1949 use the word “attack” fourteen times without 
ever defi ning what constitutes an “attack.”35  Similarly, the body of  treaties and international law 
that preceded the four seminal Geneva conventions sporadically referred to “attacks” or “attacking 
force” without further defi nition.36  In some cases, the combination of  “attack” with “bombard-
ment” made it very clear that a specifi c type of  attack was contemplated, either by land forces or 
sea-borne forces bombing land-based objects.37  The lack of  defi nitional precision is perhaps un-
derstandable, given the experiences of  World War I and World War II that confronted the drafters.  
Especially in the aftermath of  World War II, the drafters knew what attacks on the civilian popula-
tion looked like: the bombing of  London by the Luftwaffe in the Battle of  Britain; the fi rebombings 
of  Dresden, Stuttgart and numerous other German cities by the allies; and, of  course, the fi rst use 
of  nuclear weapons against the Japanese cities of  Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  For the generation of  
post-World War international scholars, the defi nition of  an attack was largely self-evident.
By the late 1970s, however, the need for a defi nition of  attack emerged and was codifi ed in 
Article 49 of  Additional Protocol I.  That article defi nes an “attack” as “acts of  violence against the 
adversary, whether in offence or in defence,”38 and provides the best starting point to understand 
34  The use of  malicious software could also have been chosen for examination.  However, the variety of  malicious 
software, along with the variety of  propagation methods and the many (non-state) examples of  worms and viruses, 
make it somewhat diffi cult to focus the analysis.  Because there are many different consequences that can result from the 
different varieties of  malicious software, the legal analysis for this capability is basically the same as for chip-level actions, 
whose modalities and consequences can also vary greatly, as can be seen in the text accompanying, infra notes 130–134.
35  Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of  the Condition of  the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva I] (using “attack” six times); Geneva Convention 
for the Amelioration of  the Condition of  the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of  Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva II] (using “attack” four times); Geneva Convention Relative 
to the Protection of  Civilian Persons in Time of  War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287[hereinafter Geneva 
IV] (using “attack” four times).  The third Geneva Convention relating to Prisoners of  War does not use the word 
“attack.”
36  See, e.g., Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of  War on Land and its Annex:  Regulations Concerning 
the Laws and Customs of  War on Land arts. 25, 26, Oct. 18, 1907. 
37  See Geneva II, supra note 35, art. 23.
38  Additional Protocol I, supra note 7, art. 49(1).
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whether an action taken by a state actor against an information system or computer network is con-
sidered an attack under international humanitarian law.
This section of  the article is broken into two subsections.  The fi rst addresses the plain language 
of  the defi nition and considers the amplifying comments addressed in the commentary to Proto-
col I.  After concluding that additional analysis is required to apply the defi nition in the context of  
modern-day warfare against information systems and networks, the second section addresses three 
interpretive theories that are available to understand what constitutes an “act of  violence” that 
equates to an “attack” under international humanitarian law.  This section concludes that a conse-
quences-based determination best comports, not only with the text of  Article 49, but also with the 
underlying objectives of  international humanitarian law.
A. “Acts of  Violence”
At the outset, it is important to understand that there are three elements to the defi nition pro-
vided in Article 49:  (1) acts of  violence (2) against the adversary (3) in offense or defense.  This 
section focuses on the fi rst element as the core of  the defi nition of  attack.  The second and third 
elements are peripheral to the extent that they are contextual in nature.  In other words, once an act 
of  violence is going to be committed, then the commission of  that action against an “adversary” 
is an attack,39 regardless of  whether the act of  violence is committed in an offensive or a defensive 
manner.  The predicate question, though, is whether or not the contemplated action is, in fact, an 
“act of  violence.”
At the fi rst and easiest level, an attack must be an affi rmative step, because, in its ordinary sense, 
an “act” is “the doing of  a thing,” usually voluntarily.40  In the case of  an “attack,” what is done is 
“violence,” or an “exertion of  physical force so as to injure or abuse.”41  A party must do something 
prior to an attack.  In conventional kinetic operations, this act could be pulling a rifl e trigger, drop-
ping a bomb from an aircraft, or initiating the launch sequence for nuclear weapons, all of  which 
result in the use of  physical force to cause injury.  In the context of  information weapons, the 
analogous “act” usually involves a computer, keyboard, and usually some type of  software program, 
though the analysis below will also examine a hardware-based action against information systems.42  
But, as with the pulling of  a trigger, the act of  pressing a button on a keyboard only initiates the 
intended action.  In the case of  a rifl e, the resulting action is a violent one; the bullet exits the barrel 
39  As previously discussed, in the context of  air and sea warfare, an “act of  violence” does not have to be against an 
adversary to be considered an “attack.”  See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text. 
40  Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary:  Act, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/act (last visited 15 
November 2009).
41  Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary:  Violence, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/violence (last 
visited 15 November 2009).  This is the primary defi nition provided for “violence.”  Other dictionaries take a similar 
approach.  See, e.g., The Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus 1717 (American ed. 1996) (defi ning “violence” as “the quality 
of  being violent” and “violent” as “involving or using great physical force”).  
42  See infra section III.B, Part III.B.
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at high velocity and causes injury or death if  it hits a person, or physical damage if  it hits an object.43 
In the example of  the rifl e, then, the outcome of  the act of  pulling the trigger satisfi es the por-
tion of  the defi nition that requires the act to be a violent one.  In a rifl e attack, the desired result – 
stopping the immediate threat from an enemy soldier, for instance—occurs as the result of  a violent 
consequence—his injury or death.  The problem that arises with pushing the button on a keyboard 
is that usually the outcome that directly results is inherently non-violent in that pushing the button 
may start a distributed denial of  service against a website, launch a computer worm program, or 
send a command to activate a software program stored in the computer of  an adversary State.  All 
of  those outcomes that could result from pushing the keyboard button, while not inherently violent 
in and of  themselves,44 effect action of  one sort or another against an information system or com-
puter network.  Those actions have consequences that may or may not be the desired result of  the 
button pusher.45  
The question then arises as to whether those often inherently non-violent actions are “attacks.”  
The easy answer, of  course, is to say that they are not.  But to do so would be to overlook the 
43  Even a rifl e that is not aimed at a person or an object has the potential to culminate in an act of  violence. See, 
e.g., John Futty, A Bullet from the Sky, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Jul. 10, 2009), available at http://www.dispatch.com/
live/content/ local_news/stories/2009/07/10/falling_bullet.ART_ART_07-10-09_A1_VVEEBLV.html.  See generally 
Wikipedia, Celebratory Gunfi re, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Celebratory_gunfi re (last visited Nov. 25, 2009).
44  Yet, each of  these actions, while not using force to cause injury, could easily fi t within the expansive defi nition of  
“computer network attack” in that denials of  service can be used to disrupt websites or even to deny access to those 
websites, albeit only on a temporary basis.  See infra notes 85–92 and accompanying text.  Likewise, computer worms 
also often cause disruptions during the course of  their transmission and often cause signifi cant degradation in system 
performance.  See infra note 97 and accompanying text.  Finally, implanted software can be used for a variety of  functions 
that could be classifi ed as manipulation or gaining control over a computer, but remain inherently non-violent.  For 
instance, programs can be activated that search the targeted computer or network for information and then clandestinely 
communicate that information to someone outside the network.  See TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING 
U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 150–51 (William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Dam, & Herbert S. 
Lin, eds., 2009) [hereinafter TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW] (describing examples of  data exfi ltration from an adversary’s 
network).  In this case, the manipulation is the use of  the software to acquire the information and the control over the 
system comes from the ability to use the communication mechanism without the authorization of  a user or the system’s 
administrator.   
45  It is precisely because the outcome of  an initiating act is not usually inherently violent that this article has 
consistently used “actions” when discussing the application of  various information capabilities against information 
systems or computer networks.  Such terminological precision is not only necessary in an article that defi nes such a 
basic term as “attack,” but is necessary in all areas of  this emerging warfare area.  One of  the primary implications of  
the analysis contained in this article is that terminological imprecision by following the lead of  the hacker community 
and using “attack” indiscriminately undermines much of  modern scholarship in this area, see infra Part IV.A.  The same 
problem occurs in United States doctrine, with the result that the defi nition of  “computer network attack” used by the 
United States is legally unsound and risks expansion of  customary international law in a direction not favorable to U.S. 
interests, see infra Part IV.B.   
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tremendous amount of  doctrinal development by the world’s armed forces in this area.46  Even a 
modest review of  American, Chinese and Russian doctrine reveals the common belief  that actions 
against information systems and computer networks is a new mode of  warfare, though they may dif-
fer on the specifi cs and whether or not these are stand-alone capabilities or must be integrated with 
conventional military force to be fully effective.47 
Unfortunately, the Commentary to Additional Protocol I does not provide additional assistance 
in determining when an action against an information system or computer network constitutes an 
“attack.”  Although the Commentary makes it clear that the intent of  the drafters was to provide a 
broad defi nition of  “attack,”48 the breadth of  the defi nition is in no way tied to the phrase “act of  
violence.”  In fact, the Commentary does not attempt to defi ne or describe what it means by “vio-
lence.”  Instead, the Commentary’s “wider scope” primarily stems from the inclusion of  defensive 
measures in the defi nition of  “attack,” rather than being limited to the concept of  hostile action that 
one initiates against another.49  The Commentary goes on to characterize this offensive and defen-
sive back and forth as “combat action,”50 a term that itself  requires defi nition and is far less specifi c 
than the actual phrase used in the text of  Article 49:  “acts of  violence.”  The reason for broaden-
ing the defi nition in this way, according to the Commentary, is that both offensive and defensive 
acts “can affect the civilian population.”51  As the Commentary makes clear, although the defi nition 
of  “attack” was to be applied to all uses of  the word in Protocol I,52 the defi nition was specifi cally 
excluded from Article 2 and placed in the section on protections for civilians to give it “special 
signifi cance” with respect to defi ning attacks against civilians for the purposes of  distinction and 
proportionality.53   
46  See generally Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, Feb. 13, 2006; INFORMATION OPERATIONS:  WARFARE AND 
THE HARD REALITY OF SOFT POWER 189–201, 207–11 (Leigh Armistead, ed., 2004) [hereinafter INFORMATION OPERATIONS] 
(reviewing Russian and Chinese doctrine); see also Dorothy E. Denning, Assessing the Computer Network Operations Threat of  
Foreign Countries, in INFORMATION STRATEGY AND WARFARE:  A GUIDE TO THEORY AND PRACTICE 187–210 (John Arquilla 
& Douglas A. Borer, eds., 2007) (describing a methodology developed to examine a nation’s capacity for “computer 
network operations” and applying the methodology to the countries of  Iran and North Korea, fi nding indications of  a 
developed capacity for “computer network operations” in each).
47  Compare INFORMATION OPERATIONS, supra note 46, at 191 (describing Russian beliefs that military objectives are 
easier to accomplish without loss of  life using “information superiority”) and 196–197 (describing Russian reliance 
on “informational-psychological components” of  Information Operations as possible stand-alone capabilities) with 
INFORMATION OPERATIONS, supra note 46, at 208 (providing a description of  warfare by Chinese Lieutenant General Huai 
Guomo that contemplates extensive use of  information warfare in advance of  a conventional military attack).  
48  Int’l Comm. of  the Red Cross, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 603 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmerman eds. 1987) 





52  Including articles that precede it in numeric order, see Additional Protocol I, supra note 7, art. 12 (“Protection of  
Medical Units”), art. 39 (“Emblems of  Nationality”) and art. 41 (“Safeguard of  an Enemy Hors de Combat”).
53  ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 48, at 603.  
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B. Determining Whether an “Act of  Violence” Exists
Given the fact that the Commentary is focused on the third element of  the defi nition of  “at-
tack” contained in Article 49 and the facial inability to apply the term “act of  violence” to most 
actions against information systems and computer networks, the line between something that is an 
“attack” and something that is not an attack must be sought elsewhere.  The next section examines 
three methodologies to determine whether such an action constitutes an attack under international 
humanitarian law:  actor-based, results-based, and consequences- (or, effects-) based.
1. Actor-Based Methodology
An actor-based methodology for determining when an “act of  violence” has occurred is sug-
gested by the Commentary to Article 49 of  Protocol I.  The Commentary is focused on the back 
and forth between military forces: offensive and defensive actions; attack and counter-attack.  At its 
broadest, and most out of  context,54 the statement in the Commentary that “the term ‘attack’ means 
‘combat action’,” can be taken to mean any action occurring between two forces engaged in com-
bat.  Under such a view, all actions taken by a military force engaged in combat would need to be 
reviewed to determine their impacts on the civilian population.  This would be so, even if  it is not an 
inherently violent action.  Under this methodology, every action against an adversary’s information 
systems or computer networks would constitute an “attack.”  
While there may be many that would applaud such a black and white rule and probably do so be-
cause of, rather than in spite of, such a rule’s overinclusive nature, it is not one that states will agree 
to accept.  Regardless of  whether they are parties to Protocol I, current state practice is to apply the 
IHL principles of  proportionality, necessity, and distinction to weapons and uses of  weapons, and 
not to non-violent operations.  For instance, as Professor Michael Schmitt points out, “psychological 
operations directed against the civilian population that cause no physical harm are entirely permis-
sible, so long as they are not intended to terrorize.”55  
Using an actor-based methodology would also seriously jeopardize long-held notions regarding 
the distinction between espionage and attacks, especially where computers and computer networks 
are involved.  In the modern information age, the gathering of  intelligence may often encompass 
actions, such as the installation of  monitoring programs or other types of  computer subroutines, 
against adversary computer systems and networks.56  When these actions are used to gather infor-
mation for analysis and production as intelligence, permissible espionage is occurring.  But using an 
actor-based methodology would mean that computer-based espionage carried out by military per-
sonnel would equate to an “attack” during an armed confl ict, subject not to the rules of  espionage, 
but to the principles of  proportionality, necessity, and distinction.  Although such an outcome may 
not matter during an armed confl ict because an act of  espionage presumably would not encounter 
54  See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.  
55  Schmitt, supra note 20, at 378. 
56  TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, supra note 44, at 190–92. 
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any diffi culty in meeting those principles, there is a greater danger.  Viewing computer-based es-
pionage techniques as an “attack” during an armed confl ict could negatively affect the use of  such 
techniques in peacetime if  there is a spillover effect so that the techniques are viewed as a use of  
force for purposes of  jus ad bellum. Most, if  not all, states have a decided interest in keeping the per-
missive international legal regime on espionage in place and would reject any legal rule that improp-
erly hindered that activity.  Thus, because an actor-based methodology would blur the lines between 
espionage and attacks, it is a methodology that is not likely to be accepted by States.   
2. Results-Based Methodology
In making a case for why a new treaty is needed to govern what he terms “information attack,” 
Davis Brown suggests a “results-oriented approach” to determinewhether IHL applies “to any 
given situation.” 57  Simply put, according to Brown’s formulation, IHL applies “if  an information 
attack achieves the same result that could have been achieved with bombs or bullets.”58  There are a 
number of  reasons that Brown’s formulation is not the correct solution for determining either the 
existence of  “armed confl ict” under Common Article 2 of  the Geneva Conventions or defi ning “at-
tack” under Protocol I.
First, in the specifi c context of  defi ning “attack,” using Brown’s approach would ignore the plain 
text of  Article 49 of  Protocol I because the approach only focuses on the result of  the action in 
question and not the nature of  the action.  Nor does Brown limit his approach to violent results.  In 
fact, he uses an example of  a denial of  service action that causes no physical damage to the recipi-
ent computer system, but is successful in temporarily shutting down its transmission capability.59  
Because the same “objective and result” could previously only have been accomplished with kinetic 
weapons, Brown considers this action to be of  the same character as if  it had been carried out ki-
netically.60  The danger of  such a “but for” test is that it equates an information-based action with a 
kinetic action without recognizing valid distinctions and differences between the two.  In fact, many 
commentators have recognized that information-based warfare has the potential to dramatically 
lessen the human coston battlefi elds precisely because information-based actions can accomplish the 
57  Davis Brown, A Proposal for an International Convention To Regulate the Use of  Information Systems in Armed Confl ict, 47 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 179, 187 (2006).
58  Id.
59  See id. at 188.
60  See id.
44 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF Vol. 1, No. 1
same or similar results without the destruction resulting from a kinetic strike.61  To equate the two, as 
Brown’s results-based approach does, would be to constrain these humanitarian ends by limiting the 
ability to use information-based actions under international humanitarian law.62
The second problem with Brown’s approach is one of  derivation.  In International Law and the Use 
of  Force by States, Ian Brownlie addressed the particular problem posed for the use of  force analysis 
by chemical and biological “devices” because they “do not involve any explosive effect with shock 
waves and heat.”63  Brownlie goes on to fi nd such “devices” to constitute a “use of  force” not only 
because the military agencies called them “weapons,”64 but primarily because “these weapons are 
employed for the destruction of  life and property.”65  In other words, the use of  chemical and bio-
logical weapons resulted in consequences that were violent in nature.  Brownlie then went on to fi nd 
it “diffi cult to regard” as a use of  force deliberate action releasing “large quantities of  water down 
a valley.”66  Although citing to Brownlie’s work to support his results-based approach, Brown takes 
the opposite view of  the same scenario if  the deliberate action occurs as the result of  an “informa-
61  See, e.g., Brian T. O’Donnell & James C. Kraska, Humanitarian Law: Developing International Rules for the Digital 
Battlefi eld, 8 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 133, 134 (2003) (stating that “[c]omputer network warfare may reduce the” 
humanitarian impacts caused by the “blunt instrument” of  military power); Eric Talbot Jensen, Unexpected Consequences 
from Knock-On Effects:  A Different Standard for Computer Network Operations?, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1145, 1166 (2003) 
(stating “the use of  CNA as an alternative to traditional kinetic weapons presents an often more humane method of  
accomplishing the same overall objective”); Schmitt, supra note 20, at 394 (stating that “[t]he availability of  computer 
network attack actually increases the options for minimizing collateral damage and incidental injury,” and proceeding to 
discuss the benefi ts of  simply “turning off ” or interrupting target operations during an assault, including the availability 
of  dual-use facilities to the populace post-hostilities).  The conclusions are correct, but for the wrong reasons.  Instead 
of  relying without question on the U.S. military’s defi nition of  “computer network attack,” analysis using IHL’s 
defi nition of  “attack” reveals that many common information-based actions are more humane because they simply are 
not attacks and the effort to shoehorn coverage of  IHL over such actions is not grounded in law, but sounds in doctrine 
or policy.
62  To the extent that enhancing humanitarian ends rather than constraining them is itself  a policy choice, it is one 
that appears to be strongly encouraged by IHL.  For instance, Article 27 of  the Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of  Civilian Persons in Time of  War states that civilians “shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall 
be protected especially against all acts of  violence or threats thereof.”  Geneva IV, supra note 35, at art. 27.  Likewise, 
Additional Protocol I echoes this mandate in Article 51:  “The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy 
general protection against dangers arising from military operations.”  Additional Protocol I, supra note 7, at art. 51(1).  It 
is this latter proscription that applies to information-based actions that do not rise to the level of  an “attack” under IHL 
as such actions are military operations even though not attacks.  Applying Article 51 to such information-based actions 
is beyond the scope of  this article.  Suffi ce to say that such information-based actions (not rising to level of  an attack 
under IHL) are not subject to the principles of  proportionality, necessity and distinction, but should be treated as any 
other military operation that is itself  not an attack.    
63  IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 362 (1963).
64  An example of  how classifying a device or object as a “weapon” may be used or cited as a determinative state 
practice by international law commentators seeking to discern the formulation of  customary international law.  
65  BROWNLIE, supra note 63, at 362–63.
66  Id. at 362–63.
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tion attack,”67 where the resulting “physical damage could not otherwise be accomplished without 
conventional munitions.”68  But this misapprehends Brownlie’s point, which looked at the conse-
quences of  an action in the absence of  what traditionally constituted a use of  force and not through 
the prism of  whether traditional means would have caused the same result.  This is borne out by 
his physical damage examples (such as releasing water from a dam down a valley and “spreading of  
fi re through a built up area or woodland across a frontier”), which Brownlie fi nds not to be a use 
of  force, but under Brown’s formulation would be “armed confl ict” because conventional weapons 
would normally be needed to cause such damage.  
Finally, the above discussion also highlights another problem with Brown’s approach: what if  a 
particular result could also have been achieved without the use of  “bombs or bullets”?  For instance, 
in the example of  water released from a dam, such a result could just as easily have resulted from 
an agent planted into the facility committing an act of  sabotage, as from a bomb dropped from an 
airplane.  The same could be said of  power plants, air traffi c control towers and many other poten-
tial targets.  To the extent there are plausible, alternative means of  reaching a result not involving 
kinetic means, Brown’s theory does not adequately address the classifi cation of  information actions 
to accomplish a result that could be achieved by both kinetic and non-kinetic means.  Not only is 
there a great deal of  ambiguity present in the use of  such a standard, but its attempted sweep is easy 
to avoid,69 rendering it underinclusive and ineffective. 
3. Consequence-based Methodology
Professor Michael Schmitt has proposed the use of  a consequence-based methodology for de-
termining whether information-based actions70 rise to the level of  a “use of  force” under article 2(4) 
of  the United Nations Charter, as well as when the use of  such actions may give rise to an “armed 
67  Brown, supra note 57, at 187 (“Similarly, it is sometimes possible to infl ict physical damage on objects via 
information attack, such as releasing fl ood waters by remotely opening a dam, causing a meltdown at a nuclear power 
plant, or rupturing an oil pipeline.”).
68  Id.
69  For instance, it is not hard to make the argument that if  kinetic means (Brown’s “bombs or bullets”) are 
not needed to achieve a certain result, then using an information action to accomplish the same result is, in fact, a 
substitution for the non-kinetic means of  achieving that result and could potentially have the same legal effect of  
the alternate, non-kinetic means.  This is a tremendously large loophole for well-trained lawyers to exploit in this 
methodology.
70  Professor Schmitt actually uses the term “Computer Network Attack,” or “CNA” in his writings, but for 
consistency’s sake, I have opted to replace those terms (when not directly quoting) with the neutral, non-circularity 
inducing term, “action,” that has been used throughout this article.   
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confl ict” under Common Article 2.71  In both cases, he was building a case for why IHL applied to 
information-based actions, despite the fact that such actions do not fi t traditional notions of  “force” 
or “armed confl ict.”  What he found dispositive in each case was the fact that information-based 
actions can lead to the types of  consequences that international humanitarian law is designed to pro-
tect:  “[a]s for the protection [civilians, civilian objects, persons hors de combat, or medical personnel] 
are entitled to, it is usually framed in terms of  injury or death or, in the case of  property, damage or 
destruction.”72  
Given that, Schmitt found that some information-based actions can amount to a prohibited use 
of  force under the Charter, especially when an information-based action is taken with a specifi c 
intent to directly cause death, injury, or physical damage to property.73  Schmitt addressed indirect 
consequences by providing six factors to be used to determine whether the consequence of  an 
information-based action “more closely approximate consequences of  the sort characterizing armed 
force or whether they are better placed outside the use of  force boundary.”74  Importantly, accord-
ing to Schmitt’s formulation, the consequences of  the information-based action must be reasonably 
foreseeable.75
In examining the second-level issue of  an “armed confl ict,” Schmitt’s six factors were signifi -
cantly reduced as the issue was no longer one of  a prohibition on the use of  force, but whether 
international humanitarian law would apply.  In other words, because the motivation for the action 
or its legitimacy or wrongfulness is irrelevant, Schmitt reached a narrower, more cogent formulation 
for the jus in bello problem of  when an information-based action constitutes “armed confl ict”: “when 
a group takes measures that injure, kill, damage or destroy.  The term also includes actions intended 
to cause such results or which are the foreseeable consequences thereof.”76  
71  To best understand this section of  the paper, it is helpful to think of  three levels, or planes, of  analysis.  The fi rst 
level, or international plane, deals with defi ning and understanding what constitutes “use[s] of  force” that are prohibited 
by the United Nations Charter.  The second level, or state-to-state plane, deals with what constitutes an “armed confl ict” 
between states party to the Geneva Conventions such that those conventions, and the attendant rules of  international 
humanitarian law, apply to the confl ict.  This level of  analysis concerns the state of  affairs between state parties.  Once 
it is resolved that the nature of  affairs between the parties is an “armed confl ict,” then the third level of  analysis takes 
over and the question of  whether an action is an attack or not comes into play.  In other words, attacks occur within 
armed confl icts (though “armed confl icts” may or may not result from a technical “use of  force.”).  In dealing with the 
fi rst two, Schmitt is actually engaged in an exercise to determine at what point an information-based action constitutes 
a use of  force or gives rise to an armed confl ict.  As part of  the latter analysis, he draws from the defi nition of  “attack” 
in Article 49 to essentially derive the types of  violent consequences that would need to occur before a state of  armed 
confl ict would come into being.  This Article takes the latter analysis and applies it to the third level of  analysis, 
information-based actions occurring during an acknowledged armed confl ict, to determine whether or not such actions 
should be considered attacks necessitating application of  the IHL principles of  proportionality, necessity and distinction.
72  Schmitt, supra note 20, at 373.
73  Schmitt, supra note 21, at 913.
74  Id. at 915.  The factors are: severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability, and presumptive legitimacy.  
Id. at 914–15.
75  Id. at 916
76  Schmitt, supra note 20, at 373.  Here, based on Schmitt’s earlier discussion of  the protections to which civilians and 
other protected entities are entitled, he clearly means damage to property.  See supra text accompanying note 742.
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Schmitt then goes on to consider whether Article 48’s statement that “[p]arties to the confl ict 
. . . shall direct their operations only against military objectives” means that no non-military objec-
tive could be the object of  a military operation, including an information-based action.77  Relying 
on the fact that the specifi c prohibitions in subsequent articles use the word “attack,” he concludes 
that Article 48’s “prohibition is not so much on targeting non-military objectives as it is on attack-
ing them, specifi cally through the use of  violence.”78  This brings him squarely to Article 49 and the 
question of  whether an inherently non-violent information-based action can be considered an “act 
of  violence” such that it is an “attack.”  Schmitt again applies the same methodology, focusing not 
on the nature of  the act, but on the nature of  the consequences: an information-based action with 
violent consequences is an “attack.”79  Those violent consequences are exactly the kinds that are 
contemplated in other provisions of  Additional Protocol I: “shielding protected individuals from 
injury or death and protected objects from damage or destruction.”80  He adds, “that inconvenience, 
harassment or mere diminishment in quality of  life does not suffi ce; human suffering is the requisite 
criterion.”81  “Human suffering” stems from the violent consequences of  death or injury82 to people 
and damage or destruction of  property,83 including “permanent loss of  [fi nancial] assets.”84  Signifi -
cantly, then, information-based actions that only result in “inconvenience, harassment or mere di-
minishment in quality of  life” are not “attacks” under this methodology because these consequences 
do not cause suffi cient human suffering to be considered violent under Schmitt’s methodology.  
Although unstated by Schmitt, as with the second-level “armed confl ict” analysis, the violent conse-
quences must be reasonably foreseeable from the information-based action in question in order for 
its use to constitute an attack.  
Schmitt’s application of  his consequence-based methodology to the defi nition of  “attack” is 
secondary to his larger point regarding armed confl ict, but it is the correct one to apply.  In fact, of  
the three levels of  Schmitt’s analysis discussed in this section, the consequence-based methodology 
is probably most applicable and most appropriately applied at this narrow, relatively well-defi ned 
level of  analysis. One of  the main advantages of  Schmitt’s consequence-based methodology is that 
it provides relatively clear guidance as to when an information-based action should be considered at 
77  Schmitt, supra note 20, at 375–76, quoting Additional Protocol 1, supra note 11, art. 48. 
78  Schmitt, supra note 20, at 376 (emphasis in the original).
79  See id. at 377.
80  Id.
81  Id.
82  “Injury” includes “signifi cant human physical or mental suffering,” according to Schmitt’s conception of  violent 
consequences.  Id.
83  As this Article was undergoing fi nal revisions, in March 2010, the Commentary to the AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE 
MANUAL was published and takes the same approach to non-kinetic attacks, such as CNA, stating that “[t]he defi nition 
of  ‘attacks’ also covers ‘non-kinetic’ attacks . . . that result in death, injury, damage or destruction of  persons or objects.”  AMW 
COMMENTARY, supra note 30, at 28 (emphasis added).
84  Schmitt, supra note 20, at 377.  For instance, damage or destruction of  property also encompasses stock or money 
that can be converted into property.  Id.  Schmitt goes on to conclude that “a major disruption of  the stock market or 
banking system” would be an attack under IHL if  it collapsed the economy and led to “widespread unemployment, 
hunger, mental anguish, etc.”  Id. 
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attack.  It also has the advantage of  not being over-inclusive..  Unlike Brown’s results-based method-
ology, not every action that yields a result that previously could only have occurred by kinetic means 
equates to an attack.  As a result, use of  the consequence-based methodology is likely to lead to in-
creased adherence to IHL protective norms, as Commanders will have incentive to use information-
based actions, but without the violent consequences often incurred through kinetic means.    
III. CAPABILITIES USED IN INFORMATION-BASED ACTIONS 
This section examines the characteristics of  two specifi c information-based capabilities and 
reviews known, or suspected, state practice in using these capabilities.  For each capability, the 
consequence-based methodology established above will be used to determine whether these capa-
bilities, or the types of  actions that can stem from the employment of  these capabilities, are attacks 
as defi ned in international humanitarian law.  The two specifi c capabilities that will be examined in 
some detail are distributed denial of  service (DDoS) actions and chip-level85 actions.
A. Distributed Denial of  Service Actions
Computers and networks are fi nite resources.  Even the internet, which is comprised of  many 
networks connected together, does not have an infi nite amount of  resources.  This fi niteness of  re-
sources is the primary vulnerability that gives rise to denial of  service actions against websites, com-
puters, or even entire networks.86  At the macro level, the action consists of  directing a large number 
of  activity requests, for instance, requests for a page view of  a website, at the subject system with 
the result that it is overwhelmed.87  The result, effectively, is to stop the system from being able to 
respond to any of  the activity requests.  When the subject is a website, the result is that the website 
is not able to be viewed by those not taking part in the denial of  service action.88  When the subject 
is a computer or a network, the denial of  service acts to prevent that computer or network from 
85  This specifi c term comes from a recent Foreign Affairs article that identifi es microchips as the “soft spot” in 
hardware-based information systems.  Wesley K. Clark & Peter L. Levin, Securing the Information Highway: How to Enhance 
the United States’ Electronic Defenses, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2009, at 2.  The manipulation of  microchips for malicious 
purposes has previously been described in information security literature as “chipping.”  See DOROTHY DENNING, 
INFORMATION WARFARE AND SECURITY 266 (1999), (citing to WINN SCHWARTAU, INFORMATION WARFARE 254–68 (2d ed. 
1996)).  It is often little-discussed.  Denning’s seminal work in this area contains only one paragraph on “chipping,” 
concluding that “[t]here are no substantiated reports of  chipping.” Denning, supra, at 266.  In fact, this turns out not 
to be the case, as the Central Intelligence Agency conducted a microchip action against the Soviet Union in the 1980s, 
with some of  the details declassifi ed in 1996.  See Gus W. Weiss, The Farewell Dossier:  Duping the Soviets, 39 STUDIES IN 
INTELLIGENCE (Cent. Intelligence Agency) (1996), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/96unclass/farewell.htm; THOMAS C. REED, AT THE ABYSS:  AN INSIDER’S 
HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR 266–70 (2004); see also infra text accompanying notes 152-160.   
86  See Houle & Weaver, supra note 25, at 1.  
87  Id. at 2; see also Ramneek Puri, Bots & Botnet: An Overview, SANS Institute InfoSec Reading Room, 1–2 (Aug. 8, 
2003); http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/malicious/bots_and_botnet_an_overview_1299.
88  Allen Householder et al., Managing the Threat of  Denial-of-Service Attacks, CERT Coordination Center, 2 (Oct. 2001) 
[hereinafter Householder]; http:// www.cert.org/archive/pdf/Managing_DoS.pdf  - 2008-07-31.
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communicating with legitimate activity requests coming over the internet, effectively stopping that 
computer or system’s contact with the rest of  the internet until the denial of  service action stops or 
the system administrator is able to mitigate the effect of  the action.89  Because a denial of  service 
action uses a considerable amount of  available bandwidth, such an action also causes a slowdown 
or stoppage in the fl ow of  information packets in the vicinity of  the denial of  service action.90  This 
may lead to a complete halt in email communications, either as an intended result of  the action or, 
more often, as an unintended byproduct.91  Signifi cantly, a DDoS action does not cause any physical 
damage to the targeted system or network.92  The servers and computers may need to be restarted in 
order to clear buffers or reset the system, but the physical hardware remains intact.  In addition, the 
information contained within the network is also usually not directly impacted by a DDoS action.93
Although a denial of  service action can be initiated by a single computer connected to the inter-
net, it is the use of  a large number of  such computers that gives a DDoS action its increased effec-
tiveness.94  Control over the required number of  computers is accomplished in a variety of  ways.95  
Multiple individuals can cooperate, either formally or informally, to share “attack” scripts for DDoS 
actions, often for political or activist reasons.96  It is also possible for a single individual, or group, 
to gain control over the computers of  unsuspecting internet users and use them to initiate a DDoS 
action.97  Such control may be achieved by using a worm to carry the DDoS software as a “payload” 
that is left on every computer infected by the worm; by luring visitors to tainted websites, which 
load the DDoS malware on the unsuspecting visitor; and by social engineering techniques that are 
designed to trick a computer’s unsuspecting owner to load the DDoS software on his own system, 
often by opening an email or clicking on an email attachment.98  Widespread growth of  internet 
“chat” technology has greatly increased the ability of  DDoS initiators to control large numbers of  
disparately situated computers for such actions, forming them into BOTNETs that are controlled 
89  See generally id. at 4–16 (discussing responses to denial of  service actions available to system administrators and 
methods to mitigate the effects of  such actions on computer systems and resources).
90  See Larry Rogers, What is a Distributed Denial of  Service (DDoS) Attack and What Can I Do About It?, http://
www.cert.org/homeusers/ddos.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2009).
91  See Householder, supra note 88, at 2 (“For example, the direct target of  a DoS attack may not be the only victim. 
An attack against one site may affect network resources that serve multiple sites.”).  For a real-world example which 
discusses the impacts of  a well-coordinated DDoS on the email and phone systems of  Georgia, see John Bumgarner & 
Scott Borg, Overview by the US-CCU of  the Cyber Campaign Against Georgia in August of  2008, A US-CCU Special Report, 
Aug. 2009, at 6 [hereinafter US-CCU Overview], http://www.registan.net/wp-conten/uploads/2009/08/US-CCU-
Georgia-Cyber-Campaign-Overview.pdf.
92  Instead, the “primary goal” of  a denial of  service action “is to deny the victim(s) access to a particular resource,” 
and is often indistinguishable from heavy, legitimate loads on a network.  Householder, supra note 87, at 2.  
93  It is possible that a DDoS action may serve to distract attention from a more nefarious action such as using a 
backdoor to place a virus or other malicious code in the system.  See US-CCU Overview, supra note 91, at 6.
94  See Puri, supra note 87, at 1–2.
95  See Investigative Research for Infrastructure Assurance Group, Diversifi cation of  Cyber Threats, Inst. Security Tech. 
Studies, Dartmouth College, 5–10 (May 2002) [hereinafter IRIA Diversifi cation Study].
96  See id.
97  See id.
98  See id.
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via Internet Relay Chat protocols and communications links.99  This dispersion of  effort is the pri-
mary reason that it is diffi cult to attribute DDoS actions to the perpetrators.100  Often the computers 
actually carrying out the actions may belong to innocent parties, who remain blissfully unaware that 
their computer is being used to carry out such actions.101
No State has yet admitted to conducting a DDoS action.  In 2007, there was much speculation 
that Russia was behind DDoS actions directed at many systems in Estonia,102 and in August 2008, 
a DDoS action was directed against Georgian government sites at the same time Russian military 
forces were entering Georgia in a confl ict over the Georgian territory of  South Ossetia.103  In both 
instances, it appeared that the actions were carried out by networks of  Russian citizens and, in the 
Georgian case, perhaps elements of  organized crime, but with no direct Russian government in-
volvement.  Because the DDoS action against Georgia occurred during a time of  acknowledged 
armed confl ict between Russia and Georgia, it is an example that is very relevant to the purpose of  
this article and bears closer scrutiny.  
The DDoS actions against Georgia bear the hallmarks of  what in the United States is known as 
a covert action104: private individuals acting in such way as to carry out objectives of  direct benefi t to 
a State’s political and military policy, and done in such a way that State involvement can be denied.105  
A review of  the actions against Georgia by the United States Cyber Consequences Unit (US-CCU) 
determined that “cyber attacks against Georgian targets were carried out by civilians with little or 
no direct involvement on the part of  the Russian government or military.”106  US-CCU also con-
cluded, however, that the organizers of  the DDoS actions “had advance notice of  Russian military 
intentions, and they were tipped off  about the timing of  the Russian military operations while these 
operations were being carried out.”107  Reports at the time indicated that the DDoS action preceded 
the Russian military advance by as much as twenty-four hours.108  Such “close cooperation”109 appar-
ently occurred well before the actual military action was initiated, because the actions were not pre-
99  See id.
100  See id.
101  See id.
102  See, e.g., Arthur Bright, Estonia Accuses Russia of  “Cyberattack,” CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 17, 2007.
103  See infra notes 104–124 and accompanying text.
104  See 50 U.S.C. §413b(e) (2009) (defi ning “covert action” as “an activity or activities of  the United States 
Government to infl uence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of  the 
United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly . . . .”).
105  For instance, during the Vietnam War, the CIA sponsored and paid for its own army of  Hmong Tribesmen to 
interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail running through Laos.  See TIM WEINER, LEGACY OF ASHES 253, 301 (2009).  The CIA 
also covertly funded Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty for decades without the knowledge of  most of  the station 
staff  members.  See WEINER, supra, at 125, 129–30; A. John Radsan, An Overt Turn on Covert Action, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
485, 494–95 (2009).  
106  US-CCU Overview, supra note 91, at 2.
107  Id. at 3.
108  Cyber Attack Casts New Light on Georgia Invasion, THE FIRST POST, Aug. 15, 2008, http://www.thefi rstpost/
co.uk/45135,news-comment,news-politics,cyber-attack-casts-new-light--on-georgia-invasion (last visited Nov. 28, 2009) 
[hereinafter News and Comment].  
109  US-CCU Overview, supra note 91, at 3.  
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ceded by the usual level of  reconnaissance and mapping required to shut down the Georgian sites 
as quickly and effectively as the DDoS action did.110  In addition, US-CCU also concluded that “the 
signal to go ahead [with the DDoS action] had to have been sent before the news media and general 
public were aware of  what was happening militarily.”111
The DDoS actions were also effectively targeted and designed to produce specifi c benefi ts for 
the Russian military advance, largely by preventing the use of  communications systems for coor-
dinating an effective response.112  BOTNETS and servers associated with Russian organized crime 
organizations were used in the fi rst wave of  DDoS actions, with the BOTNETS used to conduct 
focused and constant actions against a narrow list of  eleven target websites.113  These actions were 
directed at government and news media websites, causing signifi cant disruption to the Georgian 
government’s ability to get information about the invasion and to disseminate information about 
what was happening to the Georgian populace and to the outside world.  
A second wave of  DDoS actions was carried out against forty-three websites by hackers that 
were recruited to the cause by postings in hacker-affi liated websites.  No special expertise was 
needed to deploy the posted capabilities, as the scripts were pre-written and pre-loaded with the 
list of  websites to be subjected to the DDoS action.114  These second wave actions occurred after 
Russian troops took positions inside Georgia,115 which again indicated a level of  cooperation with 
Russian authorities that is suggestive of  the invisible hand of  state action exercised covertly.  This 
second wave of  DDoS actions was directed at “many more government websites, Georgian fi nancial 
institutions, business associations, educational institutions, more news media websites, and a Geor-
gian hacking forum.”116   These actions sowed considerable confusion, prevented the organization 
of  an effective response by the government, and disrupted patterns of  civilian communications and 
normal business operations.117
110  Id.  At least one news site, though, has pointed to a DDoS attack on the website of  the Georgian president the 
month before (July) as a “practice attack” or “dry run” for the full-scale “attack” in August, 2008.  News and Comment, 
supra note 107.  US-CCU also stated that some of  the material used in the campaign against Georgia was prepared at 
least two years before.  Specifi cally, the graphic art used in one of  the website defacements was prepared in March, 2006, 
at a time of  previous tensions between Russia and Georgia.  US-CCU Overview, supra note 91, at 5.
111  US-CCU Overview, supra note 91, at 3..
112  Id. at 6 (“The targets for attack were nearly all ones that would produce benefi ts for the Russian military.”).  
113  Id. at 4.
114  Id.  See also Evgeny Morozov, An Army of  Ones and Zeros: How I Became a Soldier in the Georgia-Russia Cyberwar, SLATE, 
Aug. 14, 2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2197514 (describing his effort to “enlist” in the cyberwar in order to illustrate 
the media fallacy describing the hand of  Russia behind the action and relating his experience of, within an hour, fi nding 
three separate methods that could be used against Georgia, two of  them fairly simple to use and at least one from a 
Russian hacker website).
115  US-CCU Overview, supra note 91, at 5.
116  Id.  Although no reason is provided, it seems clear that a DDoS action specifi cally against a hacking forum 
frequented by Georgian hackers is an effort by Russian civilian hackers to preempt similar action from being taken by 
their Georgian counterparts in retaliation for the cyber actions against Georgia.  
117  Id.
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Signifi cantly, the DDoS actions did not cause physical damage118 and they ended soon after the 
completion of  Russian military activity.119  What the DDoS actions did, though, was substantial in 
terms of  what the actions accomplished in support of  the military operation.  The net result of  the 
sustained DDoS actions was described in the US-CCU Overview:
The high volume of  cyber attack traffi c jammed many general communications links.  The channels of  com-
munication that were seriously disrupted during parts of  the cyber campaign included e-mails, land-line phone 
calls, and cell phones.  The National Bank of  Georgia was forced to severe (sic) its internet connection for ten 
days, stopping most of  the fi nancial transactions dependent on that institution.  The economic disruptions and 
other uncertainties may have slowed activities where the Georgian government was dependent on private sector 
businesses.120
But, signifi cantly, these results were achieved without a single bomb—and the attendant risk 
of  collateral damage—dropping on a communication facility, cell phone tower, satellite dish, or 
news media building, as has occurred in other confl icts, most notably the controversial bombing of  
Serbia’s state-owned television station by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces during 
the confl ict over Kosovo.121  In fact, if  the hand of  Russia was, indeed, behind the denial of  service 
actions against Georgia, such actions stand as a silent, unacknowledged rebuttal to NATO’s attack, 
which resulted in sixteen deaths and only kept the television station off-air for six hours.122 
118  US-CCU points out that “a number of  Georgian critical infrastructures were accessible over the internet” at the 
time of  the Russian military action and they “would have been vulnerable to cyber attacks causing physical damage.”  Id.   
These types of  attacks did not occur, however, despite the initiators “considerable technical expertise” indicated by the 
sophisticated and narrowly-tailored manner the DDoS and website defacements were carried out.  US-CCU concludes 
that “[t]he fact that physically destructive cyber attacks were not carried out against Georgian critical infrastructure 
industries suggests that someone on the Russian side was exercising considerable restraint.”  Id.  
119  Id. at 6.
120  Id.
121  BBC News, Bombed Serb TV Back on Air, BBC Online, April 23, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/326339.  US-CCU assumes that the effectiveness of  the DDoS action meant there was no need to bomb those 
facilities.  US-CCU Overview, supra note 90 at 6 (“the news media and communications facilities, which would ordinarily 
have been attacked by missiles or bombs during the fi rst phase of  an invasion were spared physical destruction, 
presumably because they were being effectively shut down by cyber attacks.”).  If  this assumption is correct, this appears 
to be an example of  how cyber action can be used to accomplish the same result as a bomb without the same type of  
physical destruction and possible loss of  human life that implicates the principles of  distinction and proportionality 
under IHL. See also Jensen, supra note 61 and accompanying text.
122  BBC News, supra note 121.  Even before the events in Georgia, one legal commentator presciently noted that 
prevention of  loss of  life was a potential benefi t of  using a “cyber weapon” instead of  bombs against the Serbian 
television station. See Jeffrey T.G. Kelsey, Note, Hacking Into International Humanitarian Law:  The Principles of  Distinction and 
Neutrality in the Age of  Cyber Warfare, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1427, 1440 (2008).  However, Kelsey then proceeds to draw the 
wrong conclusion from this insight, stating that a “belligerent is more likely to engage in attacks that violate the principle 
of  distinction using cyber warfare than when using conventional attack methods since it can do so without incurring 
the political cost associated with civilian casualties.”  Id.  Instead, using the analysis presented here, because the use of  a 
denial of  service action is not an attack under IHL, there is no violation of  the principle of  distinction.  This is a good 
example of  a situation where the proper initial analysis will lead a commander to take an action designed to advance the 
overall objective of  IHL–protection of  civilians–without having to make a choice between violating the principle of  
distinction (using Kelsey’s fl awed analysis) or the principle of  proportionality (that is undertaken when kinetic weapons 
are used).  
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The Georgians were able to mitigate some of  the effects of  the DDoS action by transferring 
some of  their websites to servers outside the country, mostly to Estonia and the United States,123 
specifi cally Google.124  While this served to increase communications to the outside world, it did not 
affect the communications disruptions that were occurring within Georgia as a result of  the DDoS 
actions.
Using the consequence-based methodology, a denial of  service action is not an attack under 
IHL.  An attack is an action that results in violent consequences, such as death, injury, or property 
damage or destruction, with the resultant consequences either specifi cally intended or reasonably 
foreseeable.  Even the most sophisticated DDoS action—the Russian-supported actions against 
Georgia previously discussed—did not yield such consequences.  The economic disruptions that re-
sulted were temporary in nature and did not result in the kind of  permanent economic damage that 
results in human suffering.  There were also no reports of  violent consequences that were indirectly 
attributable to the denial of  service action.  Similar disruptions without violent consequences oc-
curred in the earlier denial of  service actions against Estonia in 2007, actions more tenuously con-
nected to Russia than the actions against Georgia.125
The conclusion that IHL does not apply to even very sophisticated, targeted denial of  service 
actions is not surprising.  After all, denial of  service events are probably the most commonly occur-
ring adverse event on the internet, often occurring daily without any violent consequences.126  Such 
actions, while disruptive to targeted businesses and websites, are generally viewed as temporary an-
noyances, rather than serious threats causing violent consequences.127  Denial of  service and website 
defacement actions are used by hackers and internet activists, known as “hacktivists,” to make politi-
cal statements or as forms of  protest against actions taken by businesses, organizations, and gov-
ernments.128  Denial of  service actions are properly viewed as harassments, and not attacks, under 
international humanitarian law.129  
B. Chip-Level Actions
123  US-CCU Overview, supra note 91, at 7.  
124  CLARK &LEVIN, supra note 84, at 3.
125  See Bright, supra note 101.
126  One technical study found an average of  2,000 to 3,000 active denial of  service actions per week over a three-year 
period (2001-2004).  David Moore et al., Inferring Internet Denial-of-Service Activity, 24 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER 
SYS. 115, 116 (2006), available at http://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2006/backscatter_dos/backscatter_dos.pdf.
127  See Dorothy E. Denning, A View of  Cyberterrorism Five Years Later, in INTERNET SECURITY:  HACKING, 
COUNTERHACKING, AND SOCIETY (Kenneth Himma, ed., 2007) (stating that “the worst denial-of-service attacks have 
generally been conducted to extort money from victims, put competitors out of  business, and satisfy the egos and 
curiosity of  young hackers,” and that most political and social “attacks” “have generally not been intimidating”).
128  See generally Dorothy E. Denning, Activism, Hacktivism, and Cyberterrorism:  The Internet as a Tool for Infl uencing Foreign 
Policy, 16 COMPUTER SEC. J. 15 (2000), available at http://faculty.nps.edu/dedennin/publications/Activism-Hacktivism-
Cyberterrorism.pdf.
129  The Commentary to the Air and Missile Warfare Manual agrees with this conclusion, stating “There 
was agreement among the Group of  Experts that the term ‘attack’ does not encompass CNAs that result in an 
inconvenience (such as temporary denial of  internet access).”  AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 30, at 28.  
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 One of  the oldest forms of  actions against information systems and networks is also one of  
the least discussed, in both the legal and information security literature.  A recent article by Wesley 
K. Clark and Peter L. Levin in Foreign Affairs, however, has highlighted the dangers of  compromised 
microprocessor chips.130  Clark and Levin point out that, as early as 1982,131 the United States Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) carried out a cyber-operation that placed faulty chips and software in the 
Trans-Siberian natural gas pipeline.  The result, according to Clark and Levin, was a claimed “three-
kiloton explosion.”132 
Chip-level actions against the hardware component of  an information system or computer net-
work have certain advantages over software- or externally-based actions, such as worms/viruses or 
denials of  service.  Unlike the in-your-face nature of  denial of  service actions, chip-level actions are 
much more subtle, usually unknown until their intended action occurs.  And, unlike software-based 
actions, chip-level actions are not vulnerable to detection by anti-virus software that is constantly 
updated with the newest software-based security threats.133  Assuming accurate and actionable intel-
ligence support, then, chip-level actions have the capacity to be very effective against information 
systems or networks.134
Chip-level actions occur in two ways.  First, a microchip can act as a “kill switch,” either by turn-
ing off  the system in which it is installed or causing that system to malfunction, either randomly 
or at a set time. 135   The easiest way to accomplish this is to physically damage an existing chip by 
slightly nicking a wire, which later causes the chip to fail.136 Second, a chip can be altered by adding 
extra logic to the chip itself. This creates a backdoor that allows someone from outside the targeted 
system to enable (or disable) specifi c functions.  This addition could occur either by adding extra 
transistors to the chip during the 400-step manufacturing process137 or by incorporating extra tran-
130  CLARK & LEVIN, supra note 85, at 4.
131  In contrast, the fi rst internet “worm” to have widespread effect on even the limited version of  the internet then 
in existence was the “Morris worm,” which was designed as a proof-of-concept experiment that went awry in 1988, 
landing its creator in criminal trouble.  See United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991).
132  CLARK & LEVIN, supra note 85, at 4.  Although Clark & Levin impliedly link the failed chips with the pipeline 
explosion, the underlying sources indicate that, in reality, the pipeline explosion was attributable to either fl awed turbines 
or tainted software, while faulty chips were introduced into Soviet military equipment.  See infra, notes 152-160 and 
accompanying text.  The mistake makes for a useful hypothetical, though.  
133  Id. at 5.  See also MARTIN C. LIBICKI, CONQUEST IN CYBERSPACE:  NATIONAL SECURITY AND INFORMATION WARFARE 
20-21 (2007) (pointing out that efforts to destroy or degrade information are easily defeated by aggressive uses of  fi le 
backup systems).
134  Although the examples used to demonstrate the viability of  chip-level actions, including “kill switches,”  occurred 
outside the setting of  an armed confl ict, the legal analysis assumes their use inside armed confl ict when considering the 
question of  whether a specifi c use constitutes an “attack” under IHL.
135  Sally Adee, The Hunt for the Kill Switch, IEEE SPECTRUM, http://spectrum.ieee.org/semiconductors/design/the-
hunt-for-the-kill-switch/0, at 7 (explaining the chip fails “due to electromigration: as current fl owed through the wire, 
eventually the metal atoms would migrate and form voids,” causing the wire to break).  
136  Id.
137  CLARK &LEVIN, supra note 85, at 5.  
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sistors into the design-stage of  the chip manufacturing process.138  
The chip alterations, whether implemented physically or by design, are extremely diffi cult to 
detect.139  Because it is possible for a chip to hold up to a billion transistors,140 most chip-testing pro-
grams only test for specifi c functionality.141  If  the chip is to be installed in a cell phone, then “the 
chip maker will check to see whether all the phone’s various functions work.  Any extraneous cir-
cuitry that doesn’t interfere with the chip’s normal functions won’t show up in these tests.”142  If  the 
chip contained a backdoor, it might then be possible to override any encryption used on the phone, 
, and obtain access to the conversation “in the clear.”143  Or the chip may make it easier to track the 
location of  the cell phone and its owner, leading to the possible use of  kinetic weapons, should the 
owner be a viable target under international humanitarian law.144  As these examples make clear, the 
possibilities for using a backdoor into a system are many and varied.
The uses of  “kill switches” are also similarly varied.  A chip altered in such a way could be set 
to malfunction, or “kill”, a system when a specifi ed circumstance occurs.  For instance, in a missile 
system, an altered chip might disable “the fi re-control logic inside a missile once it had been armed 
or its guidance system had been activated,”145 thus rendering it ineffective.  The most diffi cult type 
of  altered chip to design and infi ltrate into a system is one that can be activated by remote com-
mand, or “at will.”  There are unconfi rmed rumors that French defense contractors have included 
chips containing kill switches in military equipment sold abroad so the equipment may be disabled if  
it falls into the hands of  a force hostile to French interests.146  
Similarly, following the Israeli airstrike on a suspected Syrian nuclear facility in September, 2007, 
138  Altering the design of  a microchip would not necessarily involve compromising the competitive position of  a 
commercial chip manufacturer, either.  Generic, programmable chips are used for many purposes around the world, 
including by defense contractors.  Chip programmers may use up to two dozen software programs that they obtain 
from the internet to design the circuitry for such chips and “’[t]hat creates two dozen entry points for malicious 
code.’”  Adee, supra note 135, at 4 (quoting Dean Collins, deputy director for the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency’s Microsystems Technology Offi ce).  Dean Collins is also the program manager for the Trust in Integrated 
Circuits program, which is developing a methodology for testing microchips for backdoors and kill switches, as well 
as developing plans to safeguard the supply of  chips to be used in U.S. defense products.  See generally Adee, supra note 
135, at 2–6 (discussing the contractors and testing timelines for the chip-testing); CLARK &LEVIN, supra note 85, at 
9–10 (discussing possible solutions to the need to safeguard the supply of  domestically- and foreign-manufactured 
microchips).
139  Id. See also Adee, supra note 135, at 4–5.
140  CLARK & LEVIN, supra note 85, at 5.  
141  Adee, supra note 135, at 2; see also CLARK & LEVIN, supra note 84, at 5 (stating that modern automated testing 
equipment “is designed to detect deviations from a narrow set of  specifi cations; it cannot detect unknown unknowns.”).
142  Adee, supra note 135, at 2.
143  See, e.g., Adee, supra note 135, at 4–5 (discussing the possibility of  embedding a kill switch or backdoor onto an 
encryption chip and using the example of  shutting down the encryption technology in a military radio).
144  See, e.g., Krishnakumar P., Death from 30,000 Feet Above, http://news.rediff.com/slide-show/2009/aug/14/slide-
show-1-everything-you-wanted-to-know-about-drones.htm (interviewing Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (retired), Director, 
Center for Land Warfare Studies, on use of  drones to kill fi fteen high-value al Qaeda and Taliban targets and the use of  
cell phone signals to track an enemy’s location).
145  CLARK & LEVIN, supra note 85, at 8.
146  Adee, supra note 135, at 1.
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there was much speculation that the Syrian air defense system failed to warn of  the incoming Israeli 
aircraft because the system had been temporarily disabled through the use of  altered “commercial 
off-the-shelf  microprocessors” in the Syrian system.147  More recent reporting suggests other ways 
that the Israelis gained control over the Syrian air defense system.  Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. 
Knake suggest three possibilities.148  First, Clarke and Knake suggest that a stealth Israeli Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle (UAV) was able to read the Syrian radar frequency and then use that frequency to 
send computer packets designed to spoof  or control the system back down to the Syrian radar 
system.149  This type of  system is apparently based on similar capabilities developed by the United 
States government.150  Second, they suggest that the Russian computer code used in the Syrian air 
defense control system was compromised in some way through the placement of  a “trapdoor,” or 
“Trojan Horse,” that allowed someone access to the system, possibly with full administrator privileg-
es.151  This is the software version of  the chip-level “kill switch” discussed above.  Finally, Clarke and 
Knake suggest that the Israelis may have been able to gain control of  the Syrian system by tapping 
into a fi ber optic cable in Syria.152  Regardless of  method, the outcome would have been to ensure 
that the Syrians either could not see the incoming Israeli aircraft or could not achieve adequate tar-
geting solutions in order to use their air defense missile systems.    
As with denial of  service actions, none of  the above examples have been confi rmed by the 
States involved.  In fact, the only known chip-level action conducted by a State was a covert opera-
tion conducted by the CIA against the Soviet Union in 1982.  The operation was fi rst revealed in a 
1996 article by Dr. Gus Weiss, a Reagan-era National Security Council (NSC) staffer, in the CIA’s 
Studies in Intelligence.153  Weiss described how the CIA received the so-called “Farewell Dossier” 
from the French intelligence agency.  It contained the Soviet “shopping list” for Western technol-
ogy in computers and microelectronics (semiconductor chips).  According to Weiss, he developed a 
plan to provide versions of  the “wish list” material designed to fail or not work correctly to Soviet 
intelligence.  Following approval by then-CIA Director William Casey, a joint CIA, Department of  
Defense (“DoD”), and Federal Bureau of  Intelligence (“FBI”) operation, with the assistance of  
147  Adee, supra note 135, at 1; see also David A. Fulghum, Robert Wall & Amy Butler, Cyber-Combat’s First Shot, 
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.  26 Nov. 2007 (providing a timeline of  the assault on the suspected reactor, including a 
kinetic strike on at least one Syrian air defense radar site, after which “the entire Syrian radar system went off  the air for 
a period of  time that included the raid” and, citing U.S. intelligence analysts, indirectly linked that action to “higher-level, 
nontactical penetrations . . . of  the Syrian command-and-control capability done through network attack.”).
148  See RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR:  THE NEXT THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT 
TO DO ABOUT IT 4–9 (2010) (discussing the Israeli strike against suspected Syrian nuclear facility).
149  Id. at 6–7.
150  Id. at 7 (indicating that the technology is based on a U.S. system code-named Senior Suter).  See also Richard B. 
Gasparre, The Israeli “E-tack” on Syria – Part II, airforce-technology.com (Mar. 11, 2008), available at http://www.airforce-
technology.com/features/feature1669/ (last accessed May 14, 2010) (describing how the Senior Suter program “beam[s] 
electronic pulses into the antennas that effectively corrupt, if  not hijack, the processing systems that present the enemy 
operators with their physical picture of  the battlefi eld”).
151  CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 148, at 7–8.
152  Id. at 8.
153  See Weiss, supra note 85.  The facts in this paragraph are drawn from Weiss’s article.
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American industry, then proceeded to place “[c]ontrived computer chips . . . into Soviet military 
equipment, fl awed turbines were installed on a gas pipeline, and defective plans disrupted the output 
of  chemical plants and a tractor factory.”154  
Although Weiss did not provide further detail on the consequences of  these actions in his 1996 
article, Thomas C. Reed provided a wealth of  additional detail in his 2004 book, At the Abyss:  An 
Insider’s History of  the Cold War.  Reed, a colleague of  Weiss on the NSC staff, writes that “‘Improved’-
that is to say, erratic-computer chips were designed to pass quality acceptance tests before entry into 
Soviet service.  Only later would they sporadically fail, frazzling the nerves of  harried users.”155  The 
use of  a random method would have been the only means available at the time given the limited 
scope of  the internet and the isolated nature of  the Soviet systems involved.
As far as the Siberian pipeline, Reed also provided substantially more detail.  The CIA was able 
to ascertain that Soviet intelligence was looking to obtain specifi c software for the computers run-
ning the pipeline.156  To do so, the Soviets were going to penetrate and steal the software from a 
Canadian company.157  With that company’s assistance, the CIA managed to provide Soviet intelli-
gence with software that contained a Trojan Horse,158 according to Reed.  With the goal of  severely 
disrupting the Soviet gas supply and economy, “the pipeline software that was to run the pumps, tur-
bines, and valves was programmed to go haywire, after a decent interval, to reset pump speeds and 
valve settings to produce pressures far beyond those acceptable to the pipeline joints and welds.”159  
The result was “the most monumental non-nuclear explosion and fi re ever seen from space.”160  
Though it was later determined that there were no injuries due to the remoteness of  the explosion’s 
location, physical damage to the pipeline itself  did occur. 161  
Unlike denial of  service actions, which are fairly uniform in their consequences, determining 
whether a chip-level action is an “attack” under IHL is more complicated.  While denial of  service 
actions are relatively uniform in their effects, especially with respect to a lack of  physical damage 
154  Id.
155  Reed, supra note 84, at 268.
156  Id.
157  Id.
158  This provides an example of  one type of  action that can be caused by malicious software, which is not separately 
addressed in this article.  
159  Id. at 269.  This is one of  the earliest known examples of  an action against a Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (“SCADA”) system.
160  Id.
161  Id.  See also William Safi re, Op-Ed, The Farewell Dossier, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2004, at A21, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2004/02/02/opinion/the-farewell-dossier.html.  CIA responsibility for the explosion was denied by a 
retired KGB offi cer, Vasily Pchelintsev, who headed the KGB’s Tyumen region offi ce in 1982.  Anatoly Medetsky, KGB 
Veteran Denies CIA Caused ‘82 Blast, Moscow Times, Mar. 18, 2004.  According to Pchelintsev, only one such explosion 
occurred that year on a natural gas pipeline in the Siberian wilderness and it resulted from faulty construction, rather 
than from faulty software.  Id.  (stating that a government commission found that that workers failed to put a bend in 
the pipe to protect it during sharp changes in temperature and they failed to put suffi cient weights on it to keep it down 
in the marshland).  Pchelintsev also stated that the explosion occurred in April, rather than in Summer, as Reed claimed, 
and he confi rmed that there were no injuries as a result of  the explosion.  Id.  According to Pchelintsev, the resulting 
physical damage only required one day to repair.  Id.  
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to computers or networks, the effects of  chip-level actions vary.  Chip-level effects range from a 
permanent backdoor in a computer or network that can be accessed and exploited for intelligence 
purposes to the ability to affi rmatively cause physical destruction.162  In between these two extremes, 
chip-level actions may be used to render a system ineffective, as with the rumored action against 
the Syrian air defense system, or non-functional, as with the suspected “kill switches” placed into 
export-versions of  French missiles and the known instance of   “contrived” microchips directed at 
Russian military systems.
Applying the consequence-based methodology to chip-level actions yields easy answers at the 
extremes. Chip-level backdoors may be subject to IHL governing espionage, but they are not attacks 
under IHL.  Conversely, using a chip-level action to cause intentional destruction, such as a pipeline 
explosion, clearly is an attack to which all the rules and protections of  IHL apply.  The harder case is 
that of  the potential use of  “kill switches.”  
In the case of  the Syrian air defense system, chip-level action was possibly used to render the 
system ineffective without the need to bomb the command-and-control facility or a substantial 
amount of  the air defense emplacements.  First, it is worth applying the consequence-based method-
ology to what was not alleged to have occurred, as that type of  action may arise in the future.  The 
action did not, by itself, induce the fi ring of  an errant missile or some other action that resulted in a 
violent consequence.  In that event, the chip-level action would have been taken with the intent that 
the chip’s programming would, on its own initiative, launch a missile (a kinetic act).  Such a chip-level 
action should be considered an attack under IHL.  It also does not appear that the chip-level action 
was used to cause false information to be fed into the system in order to induce the system opera-
tor to fi re an errant missile or take some other kinetic action in response to the false information.  
If  false information was fed into the system and it was reasonably foreseeable that it could induce 
kinetic acts or other actions by the system operators that would result in violent consequences, then 
the use of  the chip to provide such information would also constitute an attack under IHL.
As for what is rumored to have occurred to the Syrian air defense system, the question becomes, 
for purposes of  applying IHL, is the chip-level action separable from the subsequent air strike 
on the suspected reactor?  If  it is separable, then should the subsequent air strike be considered a 
foreseeable consequence (an obviously violent one) that triggers application of  IHL to the chip-level 
action?
The default interpretation of  Additional Protocol I appears to be that elements of  an attack are 
162  Although it is not clear whether the Siberian natural gas pipeline explosion was, in fact, caused by chip-level 
action, given the advances in technology in the past three decades, the possibility cannot be ruled out.  Although 
focused on the threat from malicious software (which could easily be introduced via a chip-level backdoor), pipelines are 
defi nitely on the short-list of  critical infrastructure concerning U.S. policy makers.  See SCADA Systems and the Terrorist 
Threat: Protecting the Nation’s Critical Control Systems: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Sect’y, Infrastructure Protection, and 
Cybersecurity with the Subcomm. on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Tech. of  the H. Comm. Homeland Sec., 109th Cong. 2 (2005) 
(statement of  Rep. Daniel Lungren, Chairman, Subcomm. on Econ. Sec., Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity); 
id. at 10 (statement of  Donald Purdy, Acting Director, Nat’l Cyber Sec. Division, U.S. Dep’t of  Homeland Sec.); id. at 17, 
20 (statement of  Sam Varnando, Director, Information Operations Center, Sandia Nat’l Laboratory).  See also Byres, supra 
note 23, at 58–59 (describing the effects of  malicious software, the Slammer worm, on control systems and highlighting 
the fact that the worm used at least fi ve different pathways to get into the victimized control systems).   
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separable, at least for purposes of  determining “military advantage.”163  Under this interpretation, if  
viewed on its own, the chip-level action against the air defense system is not an attack for IHL pur-
poses.  Although it appears to be a potential “but for” cause of  the airstrike, it is not.  The argument 
is that the airstrike would have occurred anyway and, if  chip-level action were not available, then ki-
netic bombs would have been used to achieve the same effect, but with very different consequences 
in terms of  the level of  violence used.  Here, again,164 it is plain to see that, even though such action 
would not be subjected to the IHL distinction and proportionality analysis (because not an “attack”), 
the objectives of  IHL are still achieved by using the chip-level capability in this restrained, but ef-
fective, manner.  Of  course, if  viewed within the whole of  the larger attack, the chip-level action 
is actually a small portion of  that attack, and the IHL analysis would properly focus on the kinetic 
portion of  the airstrike.
Even more intriguing than the use of  chip-level actions against an air defense system is the 
potential use of  chip-level action against individual weapons, such as air-to-air missiles.  As has been 
shown,165 this is a very real possibility, with a very distinct probability that it has already occurred.  In 
an interesting twist, in such episodes the chip-level action is actually used to prevent a violent act, i.e., 
the proper functioning of  the weapon.  In other words, the capability of  the weapon is degraded 
or disrupted because of  the chip-level action against the weapon’s information system (its internal 
computer).  So, depending on the design of  the chip-level action, the missile may not fi re, or, even 
if  it does, it may not arm, thus rendering it ineffective.  A chip-level action used in this manner—to 
prevent the occurrence of  an “act of  violence” by the adversary—is not itself  an act that has violent 
consequences and therefore is not an attack under IHL.
Moving out of  the realm of  using “kill switches” against weapons, it is necessary to examine 
the use of  such actions, whether chip-level or not, against more benign systems, such as telephone 
or cell phone systems.166  For instance, during an armed confl ict against an enemy using improvised 
explosive devices, a cell phone system could be targeted by an information-based action in order to 
163  A minority of  the 169 states that have ratifi ed Additional Protocol I, many of  them allies of  the United States, 
included an understanding that emphasizes the use of  “the attack considered as a whole” for purposes of  determining 
the military advantage anticipated from an attack.  The Declaration of   New Zealand provides the best example of  such 
a declaration:  
In relation to paragraph 5(b) of  Article 51 and to paragraph 2(a)(iii) of  Article 57, the Government of  
New Zealand understands that the military advantage anticipated from an attack is intended to refer to 
the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular 
parts of  that attack and that the term “military advantage” involves a variety of  considerations, including 
the security of  attacking forces.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 7, Reservation by New Zealand, Aug. 2, 1988.
164  See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing this issue with respect to the NATO attack on the Serbian 
television station during the Kosovo campaign).
165  See supra note 132 and accompanying text (describing the placement of  defective chips in Soviet military systems).
166  Jensen, supra note 61, at 1166–67 (arguing that military commanders must weigh the military necessity of  the 
CNA in deciding whether to target a telephone system).
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disrupt or deny the ability to explode the devices.167  Such an action is normally temporary in nature, 
designed to last for the length of  the military operation or perhaps the passage of  a convoy.  As with 
the example of  the chip-level action directed at an enemy’s missiles, this information-based action is 
designed to prevent an act of  violence.  In fact, if  done correctly, there are no violent consequences 
at all.168  Such an action is not an attack under IHL and, although an evaluation of  military necessity 
might occur as a matter of  policy, it is not legally required.169    
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW AND U.S. DOCTRINE
The preceding sections conclude that not all information-based actions against information sys-
tems or computer networks meet the international humanitarian law defi nition of  “attack.”  In fact, 
many do not.  This conclusion has substantial implications for much of  the ongoing academic legal 
discussions regarding the state of  international law in this area, including claims that new treaties are 
necessary.  There are also signifi cant implications for U.S. doctrine in this area.  Those implications 
are addressed in the following sections.
A. Implications for Law
Much of  the academic debate in this area has centered on applying the IHL principle of  distinc-
tion to information-based actions and capabilities..170  While often admitting the lack of  available 
knowledge given the classifi ed nature of  the subject matter, many commentators fi nd that informa-
tion-based actions are problematic because of  the belief  that such capabilities, for instance, denial 
of  service actions, cannot discriminate between military and civilian objects..171  Some commentators 
have also focused on the indiscriminate nature of  such “weapons,” comparing them to biological 
and chemical weapons,172 at least in their reach if  not always in their physical consequences.  Finally, 
some commentators, confronted with the distinction problems posed by “computer network attack” 
have concluded that existing international law is insuffi cient and have called for the creation of  new 
167  Cf. TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, supra note 44, at 1 (defi ning “cyberattack” similarly to “computer network attack” 
and stating that “[d]omestic law enforcement agencies also engage in cyberattack when they jam cell phone networks in 
order to prevent the detonation of  improvised explosive devices.”). 
168  It is not a violent consequence of  the information-based action if  the IED later explodes while the adversary is 
examining it to see why it did not explode earlier.
169  But cf. Jensen, supra note 61, at 1166 (stating that IHL applies “just as [it] would to any other target” to 
“temporarily debilitating the communication networks for the opposing force’s telephone systems.”).
170  See, e.g., Kelsey, supra note 123.
171  See Id. at 1436–39; Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information Operations, 11 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 1023, 1042–44 (2007); Brown, supra note 57, at 193–97; Mark R. Shulman, Note, Discrimination in the Laws 
of  Information Warfare, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 939, 953-57 (1999).
172  Brown, supra note 57, at 195–97 (arguing that computer viruses and other malicious code “that make [] no 
distinction between lawful and unlawful targets should be prohibited.”).
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international law to govern this area.173  A treaty text has even been proposed.174
A new treaty is not needed, however.  Instead, more precision is needed in identifying exactly 
what is an attack under IHL, and what is not.  The conclusion of  the foregoing analysis is that only 
those information-based actions that have violent consequences are attacks under IHL.  Specifi cally, 
DDoS actions are simply not attacks under IHL.  They may be annoyances and they may be harass-
ment, but they do not cause physical damage or other violent consequences that equate to an “act of  
violence.”
With denial of  service actions out of  the equation, one can see that the distinction problem is 
much less dramatic than has been portrayed.  In fact, the examples discussed in the earlier analysis 
demonstrate that, to be effective, an information-based attack must be tightly focused with respect 
to how the attack capability is delivered to the target and the anticipated outcome.  The implication 
of  that observation is that real-world, information-based attack capabilities must be target-specifi c in 
their design and heavily dependent on accurate intelligence for proper design, delivery, and expected 
consequences.
Calls for a new treaty to govern this new area of  warfare are premature for two reasons.  First, 
to the extent that such calls were based on a perceived distinction problem because of  the effort to 
fi t every type of  information-based action under the umbrella of  IHL, this article demonstrates that 
concern is overblown, especially where that concern is based on denial of  service actions.175  Second, 
there is insuffi cient state practice in this area to ascertain what additional controls might be needed 
or what current rules need to be clarifi ed.  No state has publicly acknowledged carrying out an 
information-based action that has risen to the level of  an attack under IHL.176  Even if  Russia were 
to acknowledge a formal role in the denial of  service actions against Georgia, those actions would 
not implicate IHL.   
B. Implications for U.S. Doctrine
The primary reason for the terminological imprecision that this article has attempted to address 
is the fl awed defi nition of  “computer network attack” in United States Information Operations 
doctrine.  The “computer network attack” defi nition is legally unsound because it is overbroad and 
173  See Hollis, supra note 171, at 1023; Brown, supra note 57, at 180–81; see also William J. Bayles, The Ethics of  Computer 
Network Attack, PARAMETERS 44, 56–57 (2001) (discussing the main issues that a US computer network attack policy 
should address).
174  Brown, supra note 57, app. at 215–20.
175  See Brown, supra note 57, at 188 (stating that “[a] denial-of-service attack is another example of  an information 
attack under the results-oriented approach.”); Hollis, supra note 170, at 1033 (pointing to denial-of-service actions against 
Estonia as “open[ing] up the possibility that [Information Operations] will create new battlefi elds for state-to-state 
confl icts”).
176  The details surrounding the CIA covert “feed” operation that led to the pipeline explosion were released in two 
informal publications, though one was published by the CIA’s Center for the Study of  Intelligence.  See generally Weiss, 
supra note 85.  These details have not been publicly confi rmed by the United States. 
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inclusive of  many actions that actually are not attacks under IHL. 177   The risk is that this overinclu-
sive defi nition will come to be seen as state practice.178  To infer from Ian Brownlie, it is an attack 
because states call it an attack.179  If  the overinclusive defi nition does become accepted as state 
practice,180 such that the limiting effect of  “violence” is read out of  Article 49, the real risk becomes 
migration of  this concept to other areas of  warfare.  Such a result would accelerate an already evi-
dent trend toward treating any military action that impacts civilians, however slight the impact, as 
prohibited, despite the lack of  legal support for such a trend in IHL.  This trend should be resisted.    
United States doctrine defi nes a “computer network attack” as “actions taken through the use 
of  computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and 
computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves.”181  The problem with the defi ni-
tion, as has been repeatedly shown in the examples and analysis in this article is that disrupting and 
degrading information in computers rarely, if  ever, leads to the kinds of  consequences that are an 
attack under IHL.  Those concepts should be removed from the defi nition of  “computer network 
attack,” and placed in a separate category under “computer network operations.”182  In other words, 
because “computer network attack” uses the word “attack,” it needs to comport with the defi nition 
of  “attack” under customary international law.  To do that, “computer network attack” should only 
cover those actions that cause violent consequences (death, physical injury, or damage or destruction 
177  It might be argued that the U.S. defi nition is purposefully overinclusive in order to ensure, as a matter of  
policy, that more actions are subject to the constraints on attacks under IHL and are subjected to the principles of  
proportionality and necessity.  However, there is no statement to this effect in the U.S. manual.  See JOINT PUBLICATION 
3-13, supra note 26, at II-5.  The Department of  Defense legal assessment for this area was published prior to the 
adoption of  a specifi c defi nition of  “computer network attack.”  See generally DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF 
GENERAL COUNSEL, AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS (2d ed. Nov. 1999), 
reprinted in Computer Network Attack and International Law, 76 J. INT’L L. STUDIES 1, app. at 467 (Michael N. Schmitt & 
Brian T. O’Donnell, eds. 2002) (stating that “[o]ne of  the principal forms of  information attack is likely to be computer 
network attack, or in today’s vernacular, the ‘hacking’ of  another nation’s computer systems.”).
178  It is entirely possible that this over-inclusive defi nition is already being viewed as state practice based on its 
inclusion in the AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE MANUAL.  See AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE MANUAL, supra note 10.
179 See BROWNLIE, supra note 63, at 362 (“It would seem that use of  these weapons could be assimilated to the use of  
force . . . . [because] the agencies concerned are commonly referred to as ‘weapons’ and as forms of  ‘warfare.’”) (citation 
omitted).
180  The number of  academic commentators citing the defi nition of  “computer network attack” already indicates 
widespread acceptance of  the defi nition.  See, e.g., Hollis, supra note 171, at 1030–31 (defi ning and using the term 
throughout); O’Donnell & Kraska, supra note 61, at 138 (same); Jensen, supra note 61, at 1146–48 (same); Schmitt, 
supra note 20, at 367 (same); but cf. Brown, supra note 57, at 186 (accepting the defi nition, but rejecting the term as too 
“unwieldy” and using “information attack,” instead).
181  JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13, supra note 32 at II-5.
182  At least one Russian information warfare theorist has done so.  V.I. Tsymbal lists eight categories of  systems, 
two of  which are “[t]he debilitation of  communications and scrambling of  enemy data,” and [t]he destruction of  
enemy computer nets and software programs.”  INFORMATION OPERATIONS, supra note 46, at 1946 (citing V.I. Tsymbal, 
Kontseptsiya “Informatsionnoy voyny” (Concept of  Information Warfare), Speech at the Russian-US conference 
on Evolving Post-Cold war National Security Issues (Sept. 12-14, 1995)).  This division of  between “debilitation” 
(disrupting and degrading in the U.S. defi nition) and destruction is appropriate and in keeping with the IHL analysis 
developed in this article. 
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of  property) when such consequences are reasonably foreseeable.  In application, of  course, this 
may become an event-by-event determination, because capabilities can be used to achieve a variety 
of  outcomes, some violent and some not.
Of  course, there are also those capabilities, such as denial of  service that may always be on 
one side of  the line or the other.  In the cases where a capability is not an “attack,” ensuring that 
it is properly designated as such will ensure that its use is not subject to unwarranted constraints.  
What becomes abundantly clear from applying a consequences-based defi nition of  “attack” to such 
capabilities is the number of  opportunities to substitute these non-attack options for kinetic action, 
with the exemplar being the bombing of  the Serbian television station by NATO compared with the 
“Russian” denial of  service actions against Georgian media and communication centers.  The use of  
such attack substitutes should be encouraged.  
C. Critique of  the Air and Missile Warfare Manual 
The Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (Air and Missile Warfare 
Manual) was released to the public in February 2010,183 with the Commentary to the Manual released 
the following month.184  Although not a treaty or a document that has state imprimatur, the Air and 
Missile Warfare Manual is an attempted restatement of  IHL applicable to airborne operations.185  
Similar to the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Confl icts at Sea,186 the 
Air and Missile Warfare Manual was created by an international Group of  Experts under the spon-
sorship of  the Program on Humanitarian Policy and Confl ict Research at Harvard University.187  The 
“Black-letter Rules” portion of  the Manual was developed over a six-year period and adopted at a 
fi nal meeting of  the experts in May 2009.188  The Air and Missile Warfare Manual “restates current 
applicable law,”189 “based on the general practice of  States accepted as law (opinio juris) and treaties 
in force.”190  According to the Commentary, “the sole aim has been to systematically capture in the 
text the lex lata as it is.”191  Such an assertion is problematic at best, if  not wrong altogether, given 
the Air and Missile Warfare Manual’s treatment of  “computer network attack.” 
As an initial matter, it is hard to understand how a defi nition of  “computer network attack” can 
be part of  already extant IHL applicable to warfare, much less the specifi c regime of  air and missile 
warfare, when there have been very few, if  any, instances of  such actions acknowledged by states.  In 
other words, acknowledged state practice in this area is non-existent.  Russia has not acknowledged 
183  Claude Bruderlein, Foreword to AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE MANUAL, supra note 10, at iii-iv.
184  AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 30, at ii.
185  Bruderlein, AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE MANUAL, supra note 10, at iii (“This Manual provides the most up-to-date 
restatement of  existing international law applicable to air and missile warfare, as elaborated by an international Group of  
Experts.”).
186  SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 8.
187  AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE MANUAL, supra note 10, at iii–iv.
188  Id. at iii.
189  Id.
190  AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 30, at 2.
191  Id.
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state action behind the DDoS actions against Estonia or Georgia192 and Israel has refused to ac-
knowledge whether, and to what extent, information-based actions played a role in the attack on the 
suspected Syrian nuclear facility.193  Likewise, much of  the United States’ efforts in this area remain 
highly-classifi ed, including important annexes to the Joint Doctrine194 and the Senior Suter project, 
which allegedly provided the technological capability that enabled the Israeli airstrike to go undetect-
ed.195  
The AMW Commentary is inexplicably silent as well.  There is no source provided for the defi ni-
tion of  “computer network attack” used in the Air and Missile Warfare Manual.  As there is no treaty 
that provides such a defi nition, the drafters of  the Manual must intend that their defi nition of  “com-
puter network attack” is part of  customary international law.  Yet, there is no discussion of  state 
practice or opinio juris to support such a determination.196  As discussed previously, the bulk of  the 
defi nition consists of  the U.S. warfi ghting doctrinal defi nition (plus two problematic additions),197 yet 
nowhere is that doctrinal defi nition cited or acknowledged.  In fact, the only citation in the Com-
mentary’s discussion of  the “computer network attack” defi nition is to the U.S. doctrinal defi ni-
tion of  “information operations” contained in the Department of  Defense Dictionary of  Military 
Terms,198 hardly a statement of  binding legal opinion.  There is simply no support provided for the 
notion that any defi nition of  “computer network attack,” much less this particular one, should be 
considered part of  customary international law.  Such a signifi cant, unsupported addition severely 
undercuts any notion that the Air and Missile Warfare Manual constitutes lex lata.  Instead, it appears 
that the incorporation of  the term “computer network attack” and its defi nition into the Air and 
Missile Warfare Manual is an instance of  precisely the type of  innovation of  the law that is disclaimed 
by the Manual’s drafters.199  
Quite apart from the question of  why such a defi nition was included at all, the chosen defi nition 
has at least two signifi cant substantive problems.  First, the defi nition of  “computer network attack” 
is incompatible with the Air and Missile Warfare Manual’s own defi nition of  “attack.”  This problem is, 
at least, recognized and acknowledged by the Commentary when it states that 
The term “attack” in “computer network attack” is not meant to necessarily imply that all such 
operations constitute an attack as that term is used elsewhere in this Manual (see defi nition of  “at-
tack” as set forth in Rule 1 (e)).  Some CNA operations may rise to the level of  an attack as defi ned 
192  See supra notes 101–102 and accompanying text.
193  Richard B. Gasparre, The Israeli “E-tack” on Syria – Part I, airforce-technology.com (Mar. 10, 2008) http:/www.
airforce-technology.com/features/feature1625/airforce-technology.com (last visited Aug. 25, 2010) (stating that the 
Israeli Air Force has not provided any details on the raid and quoting the Israeli Defense Minister, Pinchas Buchris as 
stating “[h]ow the Israeli system works, [you] can’t share with anybody . . . .  Offensive and defence network warfare is 
very interesting, [but] it’s very sensitive – any such capabilities are top secret.”).
194  JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13, supra note 26, app. A, at 1 (stating that the operational supplement is classifi ed and 
separately published).
195  See Fulghum, supra note 148 and accompanying text.
196  See AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 30, at 34.
197  See supra note 29.
198  See AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 30, at 34.
199  Id. at 2 (“No attempt has been made to be innovative or to come up with a lex ferenda”).
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in Rule 1(e), whereas others will not . . . .200    
However, in this case, recognizing a difference in terms is simply not suffi cient to overcome 
the negative effects of  such legal imprecision.  As previously demonstrated in this Article, there is 
already rampant confusion in popular and legal commentary such that “computer network attack” 
is often incorrectly used in place of  “attack,”201 which leads to the inclusion of  actions that merely 
cause inconvenience, such as denial of  service actions, as attacks.202  The use of  “attack” in “com-
puter network attack” as used in the Air and Missile Warfare Manual will only lead to increased confu-
sion.
 The second problem with the defi nition is the addition of  the terms “manipulate” and “gain 
control over the computer or computer network” to the framework of  the U.S. doctrinal defi nition.  
These additions unnecessarily extend the defi nition to actions that could encompass acts of  espio-
nage rather than any kind of  action in support of  an attack or hostilities.  In fact, the Commentary 
includes “penetrating a system to observe data resident therein” as an example of  a “CNA opera-
tion” covered by the defi nition.203  The additions are probably intended to ensure civilians that may 
operate systems, such as Senior Suter, in support of  attacks are targetable under the direct participa-
tion in hostilities standard of  the Air and Missile Warfare Manual.  The problem, however, is that the 
defi nition extends the Manual’s direct participation in hostilities standard to spies, in essence making 
espionage part of  “hostilities.”  Such a result is without precedent in international humanitarian law, 
which treats espionage and spies under separate provisions from those participating in hostilities, 
either as a combatant or unprivileged belligerent.  The “gain control” language is also problematic 
because, as the Commentary makes clear, control can be used for a wide variety of  purposes.  But 
it should be those purposes that determine the legal signifi cance of  gaining control, not the fact 
of  gaining control itself.  For instance, prior to the 2003 Iraq War, Clarke and Knake relate that the 
United States had suffi cient access and control over the Iraqi Defense Ministry e-mail system to 
send Iraqi military offi cers e-mails telling them how to surrender their equipment and urging them 
200  AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 30, at 34.
201  See supra notes 23, 25, 61 and accompanying text.
202  See supra notes 126–129, and accompanying text.  As pointed out in supra note 129, even the AMW COMMENTARY 
recognizes that temporary denials of  internet access are merely “inconvenience” and that some experts do not consider 
it an attack.  AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 30, at 28 (commenting on the defi nition of  “attack”).  
203  AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 30, at 34. 
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to abandon their posts and return to their homes.204  Although a valid and viable psychological 
operation, such an action should not be considered an “attack” under IHL, nor should it be im-
properly characterized as part of  a “computer network attack.”  Even without the addition of  those 
two terms, as discussed above in Section IV.B, even the remaining defi nition of  “computer network 
attack” is problematic and should be revised in order to not encompass actions that do not meet the 
defi nition of  “attack” under IHL.  
V. CONCLUSION
When undertaking a fundamental rethinking of  a concept as entrenched as “computer network 
attack,” the likely result is a challenge to the existing paradigm.  Being heard is sometimes the easy 
part; gaining acceptance is much harder.  But such shifts have previously occurred in the area of  in-
formation operations doctrine.  At one time the term “Information Warfare” was just as entrenched 
in U.S. doctrine as “computer network attack” is today.205  The reason it is no longer en vogue with 
the U.S. military is very similar to the argument made here for revising the current defi nition of  
“computer network attack”: “The term ‘information warfare,’ as the U.S. military uses it, is too 
broad because in addition to offensive uses, it covers non-offensive uses such as operational security, 
deception, electronic counter-measures, psychological operations, and computer network defense.” 
206 As a result, “information warfare” was eliminated from U.S. doctrine when the most recent Joint 
Chiefs of  Staff  publication on Information Operations was published in 2006.207  
This article is not advocating similar elimination for “computer network attack,” but simply a 
revision of  the term’s defi nition to fully account for the nuances of  IHL that this Article highlights.  
As was the case with “information warfare,” the defi nition of  “computer network attack” is over-
broad.  There are disruptive and degrading computer actions that do not lead to the kinds of  con-
sequences that constitute an attack under IHL.  The defi nition should be revised to eliminate those 
actions and only encompass computer actions foreseeably resulting in violent consequences.  More 
importantly, the disruptive and degrading actions that do not cause violent consequences should not 
be characterized as “attacks” in any new term devised to only cover those non-violent actions.  As 
this Article makes clear, properly applying the defi nition of  “attack” under IHL will increase the 
204  Clarke & Knake, supra note 148, at 9–10.  Although the text of  the e-mail has not been released, Clarke & Knake 
use their sources to approximate the e-mail’s text as follows:
This is a message from United States Central Command.  As you know, we may be instructed to invade 
Iraq in the near future.  If  we do so, we will overwhelm forces that oppose us, as we did several years 
ago.  We do not want to harm you or your troops.  Our goal would be to displace Saddam and his two 
sons.  If  you wish to remain unharmed, place your tanks and other armored vehicles in formation and 
abandon them.  Walk away.  You and your troops should go home.  You and other Iraqi forces will be 
reconstituted after the regime is changed in Baghdad.
Id. at 10.
205  Id. at 21–24 (comparing Information Warfare and Information Operations).
206  Brown, supra note 57, at 186.
207  JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13, supra note 26, at iii (Feb. 13, 2006) (stating in the summary of  changes that “information 
warfare” as a term has been removed from Joint IO doctrine).
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fl exibility of  military commanders to apply humane, non-violent means to accomplish military goals 
instead of  using bombs and other destructive devices.
